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Abstract
In 2016, the government of the United Kingdom held a referendum on the Kingdom’s
membership in the European Union, and the majority of voters supported leaving the Union.
To withdraw from the EU, the UK triggered Article 50 of Lisbon Treaty, which marked the
beginning of a two-year negotiations’ period between with the EU to agree on various issues
related to terms of withdrawal and the UK-EU future relationship after Brexit. The British
government has been facing serious challenges in the negotiations’ process as first, The UK’s
and EU’s objectives and interests have been different, and second, the British political parties
and Members of Parliament have different positions and visions on the terms of withdrawal
and their country’s future relationship with Brussels. After 20 months of negotiations that were
concluded with an agreement between the UK and the EU on terms of withdrawal and a general
framework on their future relations, the future of this agreement and probably, the whole UKEU future relationship is still unclear due to the persistent divisions among the British parties
on one side, and the unwillingness of the EU to make further concessions in the negotiations
with the UK on the other side. Relying on a qualitative methodology, mainly document
analysis, this research studies the Brexit negotiations in light of these different interests and
objectives and the parties’ different positions on Brexit. The study’s main conclusion is that
this complex situation may lead the UK leaving the bloc without a deal that regulates the two
parties’ future relationship, which is a scenario that none of the parties wants due to its potential
negative implications.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Study Overview
In June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) government carried out a referendum to let
the British people decide whether the UK should or should not leave the European Union (EU);
an action that has been known as “Brexit” merging the two words Britain and exit. The result
was that 51.9% of the voters voted that it should leave, while 48.1% voted that it should not.
However, the actual leave did not happen immediately as the UK government –according to
the EU Lisbon Treaty- had to invoke Article 50 of the treaty that gave the two sides a period
of two years of negotiations to agree on the terms of this split. In fact, this step was taken by
the UK Prime Minister, Theresa May on 29 March 2017, which means that the UK's actual
leave from the union is expected to take place on 29 March 2019 (Hunt & Wheeler, 2017).
Scholars explain that the UK has not chosen to join the EU (the European Economic
Community then) for the sake of taking part of the European integration project, but this
decision came to achieve the British interests in the first place. They also agree that the UK has
been struggling in its relationship with the European integration project since it started after
World War II for many concerns (Oliver, 2013; Staab, 2013).
Experts and analysts refer to a number of reasons that have influenced the British
people’s voting, leading to the winning of the “Leave campaign” in the 2016 Brexit
referendum. The EU immigration to the UK, and the fear that this immigration would affect
the older, less-skilled and poorer British workers was one of the key reasons why the majority
voted for “leave”. The economic consequences of the immigration inflow was not the only
concern of the British Euro-sceptics, but they feared the social consequences that may result
from this immigration as well. Secondly, the concerns of the pro-leave group over the
1

sovereignty of the UK was another key motive for some Brits to vote for leave. In other words,
the EU membership has been always seen by some of the British political actors and citizens
as means of constraining the British government’s sovereignty in various sectors (Ford &
Goodwin, 2017, the Economist; 2016).
What matters after Brexit referendum is the content of the withdrawal agreement that
regulates how Brexit should happen in addition to the UK-EU future relationship agreement
that will tackle the two parties’ future relations in areas such as the rights of UK citizens who
are working in the EU countries and EU citizens who are doing the same in the UK, trade in
services and goods and security cooperation.. It is still not clear if the free trade between the
two parties would continue or not. Would labor in the UK and EU countries enjoy free labor
mobility? And would British companies and businesses continue to establish subsidiaries and
work without new restrictions after the actual Brexit? Moreover, the future of the borders
between the Republic of Ireland (which is an EU member) and the Northern Ireland (that voted
to stay in the EU) is still not certain, as none of the parties concerned (the British government,
the EU and the Irish government) want hard borders (Harvey, 2017; Roberts, 2017).
In fact, before holding the divorce referendum in Britain, the British government did
not draft clear and concrete proposals for what should happen after the actual divorce, neither
did the leave campaign have a plan on the negotiations and the future EU-UK relationship.
Also, there were no previous exit cases that could have helped the UK political actors or the
EU leaders to deal with the actual Brexit by giving at least guidelines on how the relation
between the Brussels and London should be regulated (Dhingra & Sampson, 2016). Even the
UK's relationship with the European Community (EC) before the former's accession to the EC
cannot be a guide to the two parties future relationship after Brexit, as "the contemporary
international context is very different from the Cold War environment in which the UK joined
the EC in the early 1970s," (Whitman, 2016, p. 523).
2

What makes the negotiations of a Brexit deal more complex is the fact that the
objectives and positions of the British government and the EU are different and sometimes
even conflicting. Besides, the British political actors themselves have different understanding
of what Brexit means and how should the government negotiate it. Consequently this leads to
different visions and stances over the future UK-EU relationship as well as divisions among
the British parties on the withdrawal deal that the government should reach. This has put the
British government in a difficult situation where it has to negotiate a Brexit deal that the EU
leaders accept, and at the same time, a balanced deal that could be accepted by the British
political actors, so that the final withdrawal deal could be voted for in the British House of
Commons.
On one hand, the British government, for example, has been trying to negotiate a deal
that allows the UK to benefit from the advantages of the EU’s Single Market, reduces the
number of migrants from Eastern Europe to London, ends the British financial contributions to
the EU budget and ensures the government’s freedom to negotiate new trade deals with third
party countries. On the other hand, the EU’s main objective has been to ensure that the UK’s
withdrawal from the Union will not inspire other Eurosceptic movements and parties to
pressure their governments to exit the Union. The Union wants to avoid a scenario in which
the British government could retain all the benefits it wants and at the same time withdraw
from obligations that it does not like, which would be an incentive for other Member States to
threaten to leave the EU in case they want to opt-out from certain obligations (Patel, 2018).
Domestically, over the past 19 months since the negotiations started, the alreadyexisting divisions on Brexit have been deepened in Britain. There have been strong oppositions
to the British government sometimes by “soft Brexit” and “remain” supporters who prefer a
deal that keeps the UK as close as possible to the EU, and some other times by “hard Brexit”
supporters who seek a Brexit deal that would no longer bind Britain with EU rules and
3

regulations in different sectors, which are no longer accepted by many people in the UK and
resulted in the leave vote in the 2016 referendum.
This study does not seek to speculate what would be the outcome of the negotiations or
whether or not would the British government manage to reach a final agreement in light of
these splits and different positions on Brexit. This study, instead, focuses on this tough
negotiation process, highlighting how this process works as well as the positions of the different
parties on many issues related with this negotiation. Employing a qualitative strategy, this study
offers analyses on the different interests of the UK and the EU and how their different positions
may affect the negotiations and consequently, the framework or features of the two parties’
future relationship. Furthermore, it highlights the divisions among the British political actors
and politicians, which makes it more difficult for the British government to present a locallysupported Brexit proposal to the European Union to reach a deal before the deadline of 29
March 2019.
To provide these analyses and perceptions on the Brexit negotiations, this study relies
mainly on document analysis of secondary data and –to a lesser extent- on interviews with
academics, experts and diplomats who are working on this issue in Brussels and London (more
details on the methodology of the study and the interviews will be explained in chapter four).

1.2 Statement of the Problem
Because of the strong and multifaceted relations between the United Kingdom and
European Union, the Brexit negotiations were expected to take a long time so as to find a
balanced Brexit deal that achieves the conflicting interests of different parties involved in
Brexit (i.e. the British government, the European Union and the UK political actors). On one
side, the UK-EU future relationship that the British government envisions is not the same
relationship that the EU seeks to reach with the London after Brexit. On the other side, as
4

mentioned before, there is no consensus among the British political actors themselves regarding
a certain Brexit deal or model that achieves the UK and the British people’s interests. Even
inside the Conservative party of the British Prime Minister, Theresa May, there is no consensus
on any of the Brexit proposals or potential deals.
It is argued that this complicated situation may lead to a deadlock, which will result in
the UK leaving the EU without a deal that regulates the two parties’ future relationship. This
scenario is not welcomed by any of the two sides, considering the catastrophic implications of
this “no-deal Brexit”. Thus, the main problem of this research is to study the different stances
of London and Brussels in the negotiations as well as the divisions among the British political
actors on Brexit, which may affect the negotiations and probably, the future British-EU
relations.

1.3 Research Purpose and Significance
In fact, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU is the first case of a country that officially
decides to leave the bloc, and it may not be the last one according to some opinions who are
concerned about the domino effect of Brexit. Thus, the researcher is interested in studying the
case of Brexit, the dynamics of its negotiations and the different positions and objectives of
involved parties. In fact, Brexit cannot be seen as merely a vote on the UK’s membership in a
28-nation bloc; it is an important event that may lead to further wide consequences that affect
the distribution of power in the international system.
The future UK-EU relationship will be determined after the Brexit negotiations are
concluded, ideally, with a Brexit deal that regulates the terms of withdrawal and the two parties’
relationship during the transitional period in addition to another agreement to regulate their
future relationship after the transitional period. The purpose of this study, accordingly, is not
to predict how negotiations would end or whether or not would it succeed, but to analyze and
5

provide perceptions on the different interests and positions of the British actors in addition to
the EU, which makes it difficult for London and Brussels to reach a balanced deal that could
be accepted not only by the negotiators of the EU and UK, but also by the majority of British
House of Commons whose positions are significantly different. This can help to identify issues
of contention that may be risen if future in case other Member States decide to withdraw from
the European Union.
The significance of this study is that to explain the different aspects and dynamics of
Brexit, it does not rely only on perceptions of officials or politicians whose views are very
likely to be influenced by their political agendas, affiliations or interests, but it relies on
academic analyses that tackle the interests and objectives of each party involved in the Brexit
talks. This may help decision makers and relevant officials in their negotiations and may help
academics and researchers find different views on the Brexit negotiations and the future UKEU relationship. Besides, it can be helpful for scholars who would like to conduct further
research on the dynamics of Brexit negotiations and the stances of the different British political
actors on Brexit, taking into account that one of the future scenarios is that negotiations may
be extended to after 29 March 2018.

1.4 Research Questions
In light of the purpose, significance and research problem of this study, the researcher
finds it essential to explain the EU regulations and procedures that members of the bloc have
to follow to withdraw from the Union. In addition, it is also critical to know the different
interests and visions of the different parties, including the British political actors, the British
government and the EU leaders. Therefore, the study tries to answer the following questions:
1. What are the arguments of the “leave campaign” and “remain campaign”?
2. How does the Treaty on the European Union regulate the exit of EU members?
6

3. What are the different positions of the British political actors and the European Union
officials over Brexit?

1.5 Organization of the Study
The study is organized as follows: the first chapter is the Introduction chapter that
provides an overview on the whole study and its main topic. This chapter underlines the
research problem, research purpose and significance and the questions that the study tries to
answer. The second one deals with the literature review and it is divided into four sections as
follows: conceptual framework of the study, the creation and enlargement of the European
Union, the roots of Brexit, and the key EU institutions involved in Brexit. Chapter three is
mainly about the research methodology and strategies used in this study in addition to the study
limitations and issues of ethical considerations. In the following chapter, the study explains in
details the process of exiting the European Union according to Treaty on the European Union
(TEU). In this chapter, the researcher focuses on interpreting Article 50 of (TEU) and discusses
the problems with this article. In chapter five, the researcher focuses on issues of the
negotiations, highlighting the conflicting interests of the EU and the UK in the negotiations in
addition to the different positions of the British political actors regarding the future UK-EU
relationship, which may affect the UK-EU future relationship. The sixth chapter sheds light on
the recent outcome of negotiations; the Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration.
Lastly, the seventh chapter offers a summary of the study and a conclusion.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
For the purpose of this study a historical literature review has been conducted. The
literature can be categorized into three main themes in addition a conceptual framework for the
study. The first theme is mainly about the history of the European integration and the formation
of the European Union. In this part, the researcher goes through some key previous studies that
give a comprehensive idea on the very first steps of the EU, how the Second World War
motivated the European countries to achieve peace and economic development through
integration and how this integration project has been developed from a small community of six
countries to a wider community of 28 members who cooperate in a variety of common issues.
The following section of the literature review is mainly about the core of this study
which is Brexit. The studies reviewed in this section tackles more than one relevant point
including, the history the UK-EU unstable relations and the former's hesitance and concerns
towards being part of the European integration project. Furthermore, the literature touches upon
the key reasons why the majority of the voters in the Brexit referendum voted to leave the EU
as well as the counterarguments of those who wanted the UK to remain in the European Union.
The third theme focuses mainly on explaining the EU institutions involved in Brexit.
In fact, the European Union consists of a significant number of institutions/bodies that play
different roles in the EU decision making and policy implementation. However, for the purpose
of this study, this part sheds light only on four major EU institutions that are greatly involved
in Brexit, namely, the European Council, the European Commission, Council of the European
Union and the European Parliament.
Lastly, the fourth part of this chapter offers a conceptual framework on the issue of
Brexit, trying to identify the different aspects of this phenomenon and explain what Brexit is
actually about.
8

2.1 The European Union formation
2.1.1

Europe from war to integration
While most of the literature explains that today's European Union is the result of a very

long process that was started a few years after the end of World War II with the creation of the
European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC), experts argue that the European history has
witnessed several attempts to create this form of a supranational entity that can bring together
different nations and ethnicities (Pinder & Usherwood, 2007; Staab, 2013).
In fact, previous studies on the European Union highlight the significant role of
Marshall Plan that encouraged the European countries to cooperate. After witnessing the
devastating effects of the Second World War, the United States wanted to motivate the
European countries towards conciliation and integration in order to prevent the spread of the
Soviet Communism ideas to Western Europe and to prevent the re-emergence of communist
and fascist movements. In 1948, the famous Marshall plan (or the European Recovery
Programme) offered the European governments $13 billion of financial aid to rebuild their
countries under the condition that the governments of these countries work together on
developing a joint plan to utilize this aid and to create an international organization that can
administer this aid. The purpose of this plan therefore was to push forward capitalist and
market-oriented economic system in the European continent, hoping that this would encourage
the Europeans to establish stronger relations with the US, not the Soviet Union. The US effort
resulted in the creation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in
1948 to deal with distributing the fund of Marshall Plan (Staab, 2013; Karns & Mingst, 2010).
There were a multiple political and economic motives for European countries to launch
this integration project starting with establishing the OEEC. While achieving a durable peace
was a key political motive for them, the literature on the history of European integration refers
to the fact that the original purpose of this integration project was to achieve peace and stability
9

through economic integration (Bolanos, 2016). Pinder and Usherwood (2007) stress the
importance of the economic aspect of the European integration and explain that after World
War II, establishing the new European community would not have succeeded without paying
attention to economic activities to bring the European countries together.
Staab (2013) points out that after the war, all European states were facing the challenges
of rebuilding their economies in addition to the whole continent's challenge to achieve peace
and stability. The objective of each government of the European countries in this period was
to create peaceful conditions under which they can rebuild their economies and infrastructure.
It is obvious that the Europeans' objective to prevent a new war played a major role in
pushing leaders and officials to think about the idea of integration and unification in order to
rebuild their economies after the devastating war. Schuman declaration predicted that "Europe
will not be made all at once, or according to a single, general plan. “It will be built through
concrete achievements, which first create a de facto solidarity" (Pinder & Usherwood, 2007, p.
9).
The first significant step taken towards the European integration was in 1950 when the
French senior civil servant, Jean Monnet thought of creating a European impartial
supranational authority that can regulate the European coal and steel market. The rationale
behind this idea was that if a supranational authority could regulate these two commodities that
were essential for producing weapons, this would reduce the likelihood of a new war. This plan
was presented to the French Foreign Minister then, Robert Schuman and was later called
"Schuman Plan". The plan led at the end to the creation of the European Coal and Steal
Community (ECSC) by six European countries that were France, West Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg (Staab, 2013).
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Karns and Mingst (2010) explain that the success of the ECSC in boosting the
production of coal and steel encouraged the six courtiers of the community to expand their
cooperation under the "European Economic Community" (EEC) and the "European Atomic
Energy Community" (EURATOM). The ECSC members recognized that coal and steel sectors
would not be developed in isolation from other sectors of economy. In 1958, these two treaties,
which were called the Treaties of Rome entered into force. The first treaty committed the EEC
members to a twelve-year plan to create a common market through removing all restrictions
on trade; applying a common external tariff; reducing barriers on the free movement of capital,
people, and services; and establishing the European Investment Bank and European Social
Fund. The second treaty aimed at establishing a common market for atomic energy (known as
EURATOM).
This important development resulted in taking more serious integration steps in the
1960s. For instance a common Agriculture Policy (CAP) was introduced alongside with a
single market for farm products. Moreover, industrial customs union was completed and
enough internal trade barriers were removed. The governments of the EEC countries took more
measures such as the agreement on external tariff with nonmember states in addition to the
principle of economic and monetary union. Karns and Mingst (2010) argue that all these actions
were essential to achieving political union regardless of the concerns these countries had
regarding the part of their sovereignty they had to give up to the EEC.
Staab (2013) agrees with Karns and Mingst on the importance of these measures. He
argues that the EEC treaty adopted extremely ambitious principles and that its content and
structure were significant. Article 2 of the EEC treaty for example stated that "it shall be the
aim of the Community, by establishing a Common Market and progressively approximating
the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious
development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased
11

stability, an accelerated raising of relations between its Member States," (Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, p. 3).
Similarly, Pinder and Usherwood (2007) consider the EEC "the basis for the future
development of the Community" due to the wide range of economic competences it was given.
Unlike the ECSC, the EEC was not established to cover specific sectors, but it covered the
entire economy, and it had a significant contribution to the economic integration in Europe
(Cuyvers, 2017). The experts' consensus on the importance of establishing the EEC shows that
it was a necessary step for the ECSC member states to be able to move forward and adopt new
policies of integration.
With regard to the second treaty of the Rome Treaties, EURATOM, it created the
European Atomic Energy Community to tackle the issue of the conventional energy shortage
and to promote further the idea of integration among the European countries through the
creation of a nuclear energy community. The EURATOM treaty explains that the purpose of
this nuclear energy community is to lay the foundations of developing a powerful European
nuclear industry (Szczepański, 2017).
EURATOM has been playing a key role in the area of nuclear energy as it regulates the
civil nuclear industry of the EU member states, which provides almost 30% of energy in the
EU. In addition, it protects nuclear materials and technology, promotes research and
development in the area of nuclear energy, facilitates investment and ensures equal access of
the member states to nuclear supplies. The agreement also has been helping the members with
the process of correct disposal of nuclear waste and to ensure the safety of this operation
(Szczepański, 2017).
In addition to these agreements, and to consolidate the relations among European
citizens, the EU members signed the Schengen agreement. It is one of the most important
12

agreements in the EU history that guaranteed Europeans the right of free movement across
twenty two of the EU countries in addition to four non-EU countries. The roots of the Schengen
date back to an agreement signed in 1985 by France, Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg and
Netherlands before incorporating this agreement into the EU's legal framework by a protocol
to the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (Coleman, 2016).
Coleman (2016) explains that the issue of the free movement of people was being
discussed by the ECC members even before the 1985 agreement. The agreement in 1985 was
signed in the framework of an arrangement between the governments of the abovementioned
five countries outside the ECC agreement. In 1990, the parties of the agreement signed a
convention to implement the agreement, intending to remove checks and border barriers on
both individuals and goods; however, the political sensitivity and legal complexity related with
the implementation of this agreement required more negotiations. Finally, in a meeting in
Bonn, Germany in December 1994, the Executive Committee of the Schengen group decided
to apply the Convention from 26 March 1995. In 1997, a protocol to Treaty of Amsterdam
integrated the Schengen Area into the EU's institutional framework.
It is worthy to highlight that to maintain its own borders, the UK has not been part of
the Schengen Area; yet, it has opted in some of the Schengen provisions such as the Schengen
Information System (SIS) and cooperation in police and judicial matters (Coleman, 2016). This
can be related to the UK's general stance from the European integration and its sovereignty
concerns.
In 1987, EEC members adopted the “Single European Act (SEA” that was described
by Margaret and Mingest (2010) as “the most important step since the treaty of Rome”. The
authors explain why this step was vital as follows:
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“This meant a complicated process of removing all remaining physical, fiscal, and technical
barriers to trade, harmonizing different national health, food processing, and other standards,
varying levels of indirect taxation such as value-added taxes, and removing barriers to
movement of peoples such as professional licensing requirements. . . . The changes, however,
allowed banks and companies to do business throughout the community; allowed EC residents
to live, work and draw pensions anywhere in the EC; and ended monopoly in sectors such as
electricity and telecommunications.” (Karns & Mingest, 2010, p. 164).
The signing of the SEA therefore played a role in unifying the European countries not
only on the level of governments, but on level of people as well. Pinder and Usherwood (2007)
stressed the importance of this step, arguing that the SEA “strengthened both the Community’s
powers and its institutions, with influence from a combination of governments, economic
interests, social concerns, the Commission, the Parliament, and a variety of federalist forces.”
Staab (2013) as well affirmed that the signing of the SEA pushed for institutional reform and
the adoption of new policies to maintain the members’ efforts exerted to achieve a higher level
of integration.
The ECC members in 1992 (before the deadline for completing the Single Market)
signed the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU); a treaty that called for "an ever closer
union" (Karns & Mingest, 2010). Staab (2013) describes this treaty as "unique and far-reaching
in content and structure" because of its significant impact. The TEU came with institutional
innovations and new policies that made a balance between inter-governmentalism and supranationalism by establishing three pillars for the European Union. The first pillar was the
Economic Community that contained the previous treaties and their revisions in addition to
introducing new policies, most notably "the single currency and Economic Monetary Union
(EMU)". The second one provided the member states with the required framework for a unified
presence in international diplomacy by introducing a "Common Foreign and Security Policy
14

(CFSP)," while Justice and Home Affairs –which was the third pillar- provided regulations to
coordinate policies and arrangements concerning vital issues such as drug trafficking, asylum
and customs.
What is significant about the TEU is that it managed to balance between the
intergovernmental concerns of the EU members’ governments and the aspirations of the EU
for a stronger unified bloc (Staab, 2013). This is reflected in the substantial difference between
the first pillar on one hand and the second and third pillars on the other hand. Pillar I (the
economic pillar) was about supranational economic policies such as the EMU that envisaged
not only a single currency, but a unified monetary policy for all the members as well. On the
other hand, the other two pillars of the treaty (CFSP and JHA) relied on intergovernmental
negotiations between the governments of the member states. The common defence policies,
the EU diplomacy as well as policies of police cooperation and asylum are examples of
intergovernmental issues.
The Treaty on European Union was followed by a number of other important treaties.
In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed, but entered into force in the following year,
giving a green light for the Union to deal with more social policy issues including, but not
limited to, environment, consumer protection and immigration. In a few years, exactly in 2001,
the Treaty of Nice was signed, and it entered into force in 2003. This treaty brought important
changes for a more democratic Union with more efficient institutions. Among many important
changes, it led to the increase of seats in the European Parliament, introduced a new modified
system of "qualified majority voting" and gave the Commission's President more power and
limited the number of commissions to one per state Parliament (Karns & Mingst, 2010).
Furthermore, in December 2009, the ratification of Lisbon Treaty introduced some
substantial institutional changes such as the reform of the system of voting in the EU's Council
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of Ministers. Lisbon Treaty, according to Devaney and Poptcheva (2014), came to change the
old weighted-vote system of the Council which was imposed by the Treaty of Nice that required
“74% of Member States’ weighted votes cast by a majority of Member States, and, optionally,
a check that the majority represented 62% of the EU's total population” (Devaney and
Poptcheva, 2014, p. 1). The main criticism addressed to this system is that the threshold of a
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) was too high that it could have hindered the Union’s ability
to take substantial decisions. The authors explain that to fix this issue, the Lisbon Treaty
introduced a new voting method that considered the demographic weight of the EU Member
States, which came in line with the principle of “one citizen – one vote”. To new acts by the
Council of Ministers, this new system required the approval of 55% of the Member States (16
members) representing 65% of the whole EU population. Besides, to prevent the larger EU
countries from forming a bloc to stop proposals, the Lisbon treaty required that a blocking
coalition has to include at least four EU members representing at least 35% of the EU
population.
Most importantly, the Lisbon Treaty introduced for the first time the right of an EU
member state to withdraw from the Union as explained by the treaty’s Article 50. In five
paragraphs, Article 50 of the treaty states clearly that any Member State has the right to
withdraw from the Union and explains the procedures that a member would need to follow in
case it decides to exit (Poptcheva, 2016). This article is the one that the British government had
to invoke in March 2017 to start the Brexit negotiations with the EU and it is the article that
explains the procedures that have to be followed by the EU member states that would like to
withdraw from the Union.
2.1.2

Enlargement of the European Union
The number of EU (or EC) member states has not increased suddenly from six to 28,

but the Community has witnessed phases of enlargement. The six founding members of ECSC
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considered integrating new members as part of their integration plan, and that is why they
tended to leave the door open for other European countries to join (European Commission —
Directorate General for Enlargement, 2011). Emmert and Petrovi (2014) point out that since
the six founding members signed the Treaties of Rome in 1957, there have been seven phases
of enlargement, one every six-eight years on average. And if one takes into consideration that
the accession of a new member takes years for negotiations and transitional periods for the new
member(s), then one can say that the EU has been carrying out a never-ending enlargement
process since 1957.
The first enlargement of the Community took place in 1973 with the accession of
Denmark, Ireland and Great Britain after more than one attempt to join. The focus of the
literature that covers this first round of enlargement is mainly on the UK accession due to the
weight of this country and the change of its stance towards joining the ECSC, which is
explained further in the third section of this chapter. Yet, it is worthy to mention here that in
addition to Britain's undecided stance towards the European integration, its attempts in the
sixties to join the European Economic Community were hindered by the rejection of former
President of France, Charles de Gaulle. After the step down of de Gaulle in 1969, Britain,
Denmark and Ireland applied again to join the EEC and they acceded in 1973 (Emmert &
Petrovi, 2014).
In the eighties, Greece (in 1981), Spain and Portugal (both in 1986) acceded as well.
Spain, like the UK, tried more than once to join the EEC, and there were many concerns
(political and economic) on its accession. On contrary, the applications submitted by Portugal
and Greece were welcomed by the members of the Community for political reasons although
the members had doubts concerning the economy of Portugal and its ability to withstand the
pressures the EEC would bring (Emmert & Petrovi, 2014).
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There was another enlargement wave in 1995 when Finland, Sweden and Austria were
admitted (McIver, 2011). The negotiations started in February 1993 and were concluded in less
than two years. It should be mentioned here that the three new members had to hold referenda
for their citizens to decide on the EEC membership, as the accession was objected by a
significant number of each country's citizens. In fact, Norway was the fourth country that tried
to join the EC in this enlargement round, but unlike the results of the national referenda in
Finland, Sweden and Austria, the majority of votes of the national referendum in Norway chose
not to join the European Community (Emmert & Petrovi, 2014). This was the second attempt
of Norway to be part of the European integration project as the first was in 1972 (Bjorklund,
1997).
The two years 2004 and 2007 witnessed another two rounds of enlargement by the
accession of twelve countries; ten of them in 2004, and the rest followed in 2007. These first
ten were Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia, and Romania and Bulgaria followed them in 2007. The ten Central and
East European states that joined in 2004 had to transfer their economies and political systems
from centralized communist control to the market economies and pluralist democracies to join
the EU. By 1997, only five candidates were ready with enough progress of the required changes
and three years later, another five followed them (Pinder & Usherwood, 2007). This
enlargement wave is described by Murphy (2006) as one of the most ambitious initiatives in
the European integration history. He explains that the accession of those ten countries with
their different economic profiles had a positive effect on investment, facilitated migration flows
and created new regional cooperation initiatives.
The last enlargement round that was in 2013 witnessed the accession of Croatia. It is
believed that the 1991-1995 war with Serbia and the priorities of the successive Croatian
governments did not help the country to be part of the previous enlargements in 2004 and 2007.
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The EU also had concerns on democracy and respect of human rights and rule of law in Croatia.
However, the breakthrough happened when Croatia signed the Stabilisation and Association
Agreement (SAA) in 2001. In the following years, Croatia has been trying to meet the criteria
to join the EU, and there was a screening process by the latter started in October 2005 to
evaluate how Croatia was doing with 35 required changes in different areas to accept the
candidate country's membership request. The country concluded its accession negotiations in
mid-2011, and the country held the accession national referendum in January 2012 when more
than 66% of the voters voted in favor, giving the green light to the government to ratify the
agreement and announce officially that the country has become an EU member (Emmert &
Petrovi, 2014).
The accession of Croatia in 2013 might not be the last EU enlargement wave, as there
is a number of European countries that are willing to join the Union in future. According to the
European Commission’s official website, there are five candidate countries that are Albania,
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM), Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. These
five countries have already applied for the EU membership and were declared officially as
candidate countries, but the negotiations with these candidates are still ongoing. Moreover,
there are other two potential candidates that are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. They
have a serious intention to join the EU in future, but they still have not received the official
candidate status. ("Candidate countries and potential candidates", 2018).

2.2 Brexit
2.2.1

The roots of Brexit
The great majority of literature agrees that the UK has been having unstable relationship

with the EU even before Britain's accession to the European Community. According to report
by Global Economic Dynamics (2015), the UK in the early stages of European integration has
been rejecting to be part of the European integration process until 1961 when the UK
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government decided to join the European Economic Community (EEC). After more than one
attempt, the UK finally managed to join the European Community in 1973. Yet, after two years,
the British government then conducted the first referendum in the UK’s history to leave the EU
(European Community then), but 66% of voters chose to remain.
The literature refers to different reasons behind the UK decision to not take part in the
ECSC. For example, Karns and Mingst (2010) argue that the two major political parties in the
UK –the Conservative Party and the Labour Party- were against the idea of joining the ECSC
as they did not want their country to give up its sovereignty and control over coal and steel.
Staab (2013) explains that the UK did not have the same vision of other European
countries because the government then adopted an ambitious economic plan that included the
nationalization of the coal and steel sector. Even in a later stage in the 1960s, EURATOM
proposed the inclusion of the UK and invited representatives from London to attend the
meeting at Messina, but the UK's stance supported only a very limited integration, which was
inconsistent with the other countries' stance.
This hesitance towards its membership can be attributed to the fact that the UK aimed
at achieving only self-interests by joining the EU. Oliver (2013) explains that the EU option
was not considered as the choice Britain wanted to make, but the choice that it had to make as
a requirement for its survival. Even Britain's former Prime Minister, David Cameron said in
his speech in May 2016 that the British "have always seen the European Union as a means to
an end" to boost Britain's prosperity.
For some reasons (that will be discussed in the coming section), there has been a
growing opposition the UK’s membership of the EU. As a result of the growing opposition,
Euro-skeptic movements have emerged in the UK. The most successful and influential among
them was the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) that was established in 1993 and
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that –in a period of 22 years only- has managed to become one of the most successful newly
established parties in Britain (Ford and Goodwin, 2017).
The party played an important role to make Brexit happen. It managed to influence the
public opinion and convince British voters with the advantages of leaving the EU through
fusing its messages of departing from the union with the strong opposition to immigration. The
rise of the UKIP and the pressure by some Euro-skeptic conservative Members of Parliament
were a main factor that led David Cameron to commit in 2013 to holding the abovementioned
Brexit referendum.
In June 2016, the British government carried out a referendum to let the British people
decide whether the UK should or should not leave the European Union (EU); an action that has
been known as “Brexit” merging the two words Britain and exit. The result was that 51.9% of
the voters voted that it should leave (this camp has been known as the leave campaign), while
48.1% voted that it should not (this group has been known as the “remain campaign”).
However, the actual leave did not happen immediately as the UK government –according to
the EU Lisbon treaty- had to invoke Article 50 of the treaty that gives the two sides a period of
two years of negotiations to agree on the terms of this split. In fact, this step was taken by the
UK’s Prime Minister Theresa May on 29 March 2017, which means that the UK's actual leave
from the union is expected to take place on 29 March 2019 (Hunt & Wheeler, 2017).
2.2.2

The leave and remain campaigns
The British Euro-skeptic voters had social, economic and political reasons to vote to

leave the EU. The literature on Brexit over the past couple of years has been referring to the
debates between leavers and remainers concerning these reasons or arguments to withdraw
from the Union. In fact, the two campaigns focused on different issues that reflected the
priorities and profiles of their supporters (Ford & Goodwin, 2017). Generally, the antiEU/leave campaign’s key message was “taking back control” of the UK’s borders, law-making,
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the EU threats to the UK’s national sovereignty and the financial contributions that the British
government pays to the EU budget. On the other hand, the pro-EU/remain campaign’s main
arguments focused on the economic gains of the EU membership or, in other words, the
economic risks of departing from the Union. They also focused on maintaining the UK
influence in the world and its image as a globalized marketplace. (Ford & Goodwin, 2017;
Swales, n.d.).
On the social level, experts emphasize that the result of the Brexit referendum was
expected, as British citizens have been “the most Eurosceptic electorate in the EU ever since
the UK joined in 1973” (Hobolt, 2016, p. 1260). According to Ford and Goodwin (2017), since
2004, the issue of immigration has featured strong debates and strong demands for imposing
more control of inflows. The repeated failure of the British governments to meet these demands
led anxious voters to lose faith in the ability of the UK major parties to control the inflow of
immigrants from other European countries, which they thought was a key factor that affected
the public services, welfare and the British identity. The citizens' concerns about immigration
were the motive for a growing opposition in Britain concerning its EU membership that has
been believed to be the key reason of this uncontrollable migration inflows and the obstacle in
front of any effective solution.
The British Euro-skeptic group believed that immigration from Eastern Europe to
London was a main reason behind many social issues as well. They argued that it burdened
British taxpayers as well as the British government that had to increase the welfare spending.
Furthermore, they saw that immigration negatively affected public services such as health care
and education. Also, it is argued by this group that immigration results in further economic and
socio-economic problems such replacing Britons by others in some jobs, reducing wages and
aggravating the housing crises (The Economist, 2016).

22

Oliver (2017) refers to another important motive for the UK citizens to vote for leave,
which is the communities that have been negatively affected by the UK's and EU's globalized
and open economies. The author explains that the immigrants’ inflow under the framework of
globalized style of economic relations harmed older, less-skilled and poorer workers who of
course pressured the government and voted for leave in the referendum.
In 2014 for example, the decision of the British as well as other EU governments had
to lift the temporary restrictions imposed on Romanian and Bulgarian citizens' rights to work
in the United Kingdom led to a significant increase of the number of the European immigrant
workers to the UK. In less than one year after the decision, the number of Bulgarian and
Romanian workers in the UK was raised by nearly 50,000 to a total of 189,000 workers (Travis,
2014). Furthermore, statistics show that the number of Bulgarian and Romanian citizens living
in Britain has increased by almost 80% (from 230,000 to 413,000) between 2014 and 2016
(Travis, 2017). This major increase in numbers of workers who migrated to the UK played a
key role in convincing the leave campaign supporters to vote for leaving in the Brexit
referendum.
In fact, the literature shows that the pro-EU group did not have a solid counterargument
on the social or economic effects of the immigration from the EU members to the UK. They
rather stressed that the issue of immigrants’ inflow will persist anyways and that exiting the
EU would not help solving this problem. On their official website, the main pro-remain
campaign, “Britain Stronger in Europe” addressed this point and argued that:
Leaving the EU will not stop immigration to the UK. Countries such as Norway and
Switzerland, who are not part of the EU, have to accept free movement and have higher
rates of EU migration than the UK. If we adopted the Australian points system proposed
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by Vote Leave, would give us double the levels of immigration. ("Immigration", 2016, para.
1)
Similarly, the report of the Economist (2016), claimed that departing from the EU
would not lead to overcoming the EU migration challenge because after the withdrawal takes
place, Britain may seek to maintain full access to the Union’s Single Market (like Norway and
Switzerland), which would require London to accept the free movement of people.
Furthermore, the “remain campaign” was claiming that the EU migrants benefited the British
economy as they made net contributions to the UK budget through paying taxes (Chappell,
2016).
On the economic level, leavers claimed that the economy of the European Union had
failed (especially after the Eurozone crisis) and that the Union’s regulations hindered the
British businesses more than it helped them. Moreover, they saw that withdrawing from the
EU would not threat employment as job opportunities are linked to trade not to political union.
Hence, they assumed that when the British companies are freed from the costs and restrictions
of the EU, the economy would do better (Chappell, 2016).
These claims have been refuted by “remainers” who saw a better economic situation
for the UK inside the Union. They assumed that the EU supported the British businesses,
created job opportunities for Britons and contributed in delivering lower prices for consumers.
Besides, they stressed that by withdrawing from the EU, investments would significantly
decrease and that the UK would lose millions of jobs as global manufacturers would move their
businesses to other lower-cost EU members (Chappell, 2016).
The cost of the EU membership was also present in the debate between the two camps.
Brexiteers assumed that departing from the Union would help the government save a significant
amount of money that it paid as a contribution to the EU budget every year. In 2016, for
24

instance, the British government paid £13.1billion; yet, it received £4.5billion worth of
spending. This means that in this year, the UK’s net contribution to the EU budget was £8.5
billion ("Brexit: the pros and cons of leaving the EU", 2018).
On the other side, the pro-EU camp believed that the benefits that the UK made through
being a member of the EU Single Market far outweighed this cost. For example, according to
remainers, while the contribution of the UK to the EU budget is equivalent to £340 per British
household annually, the increased trade volume, investments and lower prices because of the
EU membership contribute with around £3000 per British household annually (Chappell,
2016).
Trade also has received a special attention during the Brexit campaign. Some British
Euro-skeptics thought that after Brexit, the UK would actually withdraw from the political
aspects of the EU, so it would no longer be bound by the latter’s laws on justice, home affairs
and agriculture, but would still be a member of the Single Market of the Union. In addition, the
anti-EU camp claimed that the EU membership restricted the trade activities of the vast
majority of Britain’s small and medium-sized firms that did not trade with the EU countries,
but had to abide by the bloc’s laws and regulations. Hence, some Brexiteers such as the former
British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and prominent Brexit
supporter, Boris Johnson called for a Canadian-style trade agreement between London and
Brussels to ensure that the former would have access to the Single Market without having to
be a member of the Market and accept the EU rules ("Brexit: the pros and cons of leaving the
EU", 2018).
Nonetheless, addressing this point, anti-Brexit campaigns excluded such an optimistic
scenario, arguing that the EU would intentionally put Britain in a tough situation in order to
avoid the domino effect of Brexit and prevent the withdrawal of other Member State. For
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instance, former British Prime Minister who was against Brexit, David Cameron saw this
scenario inapplicable as the Canadian deal required seven years of “painful negotiations” and
would result in a poorer deal than what the UK had as an EU member. In addition, the remain
campaigners argued that introducing trade barriers and implementing tariffs would expose the
UK’s economy to serious risks, taking into account the fact that the EU is the largest trading
partner ("Brexit: the pros and cons of leaving the EU", 2018; Chappell, 2016).
On the political level, the UK sovereignty and whether or not the EU undermined this
sovereignty has been debated by the two camps. The report by the Economist (2016) highlights
that Brexiteers such as former British Secretary of Justice and prominent Brexit supporter,
Michael Gove complained that the UK’s membership of the EU prevented London from
making critical decisions that affected the lives of all British people. Furthermore, the report
also quotes Johnson who said that the sovereignty of the British parliament was nonexistent
under the UK’s membership of the EU. Furthermore, for some Brexiteers, the EU membership
has been considered as a sovereignty sacrifice as it led the British government to give up part
of its control over domestic affairs. They also that being a member of the Union made the
British parliament as the EU institutions were more powerful and influential ("Brexit: the pros
and cons of leaving the EU", 2018).
These claims have been rejected by the anti-Brexit camp that had a more realistic
interpretation of the concept of sovereignty. First some commentators such as Foster (2016)
argued that in today’s globalized world, all countries are required to make trade-offs on
sovereignty and that even after Brexit, the UK would still have to accept to give up part of its
sovereignty. The author, for example, refers to the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) that imposes an obligation on members to be part of the mutual defence
of fellow members, according to the treaty’s Article 5.
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In addition, remainers also argued that the primacy of the EU laws over the national
British laws did not necessarily mean that the UK has no sovereignty, but this was part of the
UK’s commitment to the EU treaties that the former voluntarily chose to be part of. This choice
in itself as well as the decision to leave the Union, according to the anti-Brexit groups,
represented sovereignty of the British government and institutions ("What is sovereignty?",
n.d.).

2.3 The European Union Institutions
In order to take decisions, follow up with their implementation, discuss common issues
among the members and maintain relations with other countries, the EU members created a
number of institutions that help the organization and its members in these matters. The
researcher sees that to understand the Brexit process and negotiations, one should first
understand the function of each of the EU organs that are involved in Brexit. Therefore, in light
of the recent negotiations between Britain and the EU, this section of literature review does not
tackle all the EU's organs, but it focuses mainly on the ones that are relevant to the issue of
Brexit in terms of negotiations and the implementation of the future Brexit deal.
The institutions discussed here are the European Council, the Council of the EU, the
European Commission and the European Parliament. It is worthy to mention here that three of
these institutions (namely, the Parliament, the Council and the Commission) are the three main
institutions involved in decision-making in general in the EU.
2.3.1

The European Council
The European Council is the body responsible for the EU's general political directions

and priorities. Although the European Council became an official EU institution only in 2009,
it existed as an informal forum since 1974 and gained a formal status in 1992. It brings together
the heads of state or governments of the EU members to set the Union's political agenda, which
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represents the highest level of political cooperation between the EU members. The Council
takes form of summit meetings that take place at least four times a year in addition to
extraordinary or informal meetings that are held when needed to address urgent matters. The
work of the council is coordinated by the Council's president who is appointed for a two and a
half year term and can be re-elected for one more term on the basis of a qualified majority vote
by the Council's members. The president plays a vital role by convening and chairing the
Council's meetings, representing the Union and its interests to the outside world ("European
Council", n.d.; European Union, 2014; AGE Platform Europe, 2010).
As part of the Council's tasks, it deals with complex and sensitive issues that are hard
to be resolved at lower levels of intergovernmental relations; it sets the EU's common foreign
and security policy; and nominates and appoints candidates in high profile EU positions
("European Council", n.d.).
The European Council does not have a legislative power, but after each meeting, it
issues conclusions that reflect the main points of the discussions and evaluates the decisions
taken. The importance of these conclusions is that they identify the major issues that the council
will be dealing with (European Union, 2014).
With regard to Brexit, the role of the European council (without the UK) was to draft
guidelines that outline the key principles for the negotiations. The approved version of these
guidelines should be sent afterwards to the European Commission and Council of the European
Union to be adopted as a starting point upon which the Commission can draft a detailed
mandate and recommendations for Brexit negotiations ("The EU’s role in Brexit negotiations",
n.d.).
2.3.2

The European Commission
In the literature, the European Commission –that was established in 1958 - is referred

to as "the executive arm of the EU that proposes laws policies agreements and promotes the
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Union" (European Union, 2014, p. 19). It is consisted of a team or "College" of Commissioners
(only one commissioner from each EU member state) in addition to the President and VicePresident of the Commission who all meet once a week in Brussels. It is important to clarify
here that although those Commissioners are appointed by the member states of the
Commission, they do not represent their countries' own interests, neither do they take
instructions from their governments, but they are committed to acting in the common interest
of the whole EU (AGE Platform Europe, 2010, "European Commission", n.d.; European
Union, 2014).
The Commission is tasked with four main responsibilities. The first is proposing new
laws to maintain the interests of the Union and EU citizens, especially when it comes to issues
that national governments cannot deal with effectively. The Commission is the only EU
institution that has the "right of initiative" that allows it to draw up proposals for new European
legislations. Secondly, the Commission is responsible for managing EU laws and allocating
EU funding. In other words, jointly with the Council of European Union and European
Parliament, the Commission sets the Union's spending priorities, draws up its annual budget
and supervises how the money is spent. A third task for this vital institution is enforcing the
EU laws by ensuring that the EU law is applied properly in all the EU member states, which
happens in coordination with the Court of Justice. Lastly, the Commission is responsible for
representing the EU internationally. It speaks on behalf of all the EU countries in international
platforms and negotiates international agreements for the Union ("European Commission",
n.d.; European Union, 2014).
Based on this vital role, the Commission is involved in Brexit and its role is to draft a
detailed mandate for the Brexit negotiations after it receives the European Council's guidelines
of Brexit negotiations. The Commission's mandate should include recommendations on each
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area of Brexit negotiations and cover the process through which the negotiations will be
conducted.
2.3.3

Council of the European Union
In the Council of the European Union, all EU members have a ministerial-level

representation where ministers meet to discuss different issues, take decisions and pass laws.
The ministers who represent their countries in the Council differ according to the policy area
to be discussed. This council, together with the European Parliament, is considered the
European Union's main decision-making institution and jointly with the European Parliament,
it has the authority to approve, amend or reject laws proposed by the European Commission.
In general, the Council works on proposals submitted by the Commission, while the latter is
responsible for making sure that the EU legislated laws are correctly applied. Accordingly, it
can be said that the ministers in this council have the power to make their governments
committed to implement decisions taken in the Council's meetings (AGE Platform Europe,
2010; "European Council", n.d; The European Union, 2014).
In addition to the previously mentioned tasks, the Council of European Union is also
responsible for concluding agreements between the European Union and the outside world
(whether countries or organizations) and adopts the Union's annual budget with the Parliament
("Council of the European Union", n.d.).
In the issue of Brexit, the role of the Council of European Union is to discuss the
mandate that has been already drafted by the Commission and to agree by a qualified majority
vote (excluding Britain) on this mandate ("The EU’s role in Brexit negotiations", n.d.). In
January 2018, the Council adopted complementing directives and submitted them to the
Union’s Commission to negotiate with the UK the transition period after withdrawal in addition
to other issues related to Brexit ("Brexit: Council (Article 50) adopts negotiating directives on
the transition period", 2018).
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2.3.4

The European Parliament
The European Parliament is the legislative arm of the EU. It consists of 751 members

who are directly elected by the EU citizens for a five-year term. The European Parliament seats
are distributed among the member states on the basis of each state's share of the EU population
(European Union, 2014).
Concerning its functions, the European Parliament, like any other parliament has three
key functions. The first and most important one is legislating laws together with the Council
of the European Union based on the Commission's proposals. This includes deciding on
international agreements, EU enlargements and asking the Commission to propose new laws.
Besides, the Parliament also plays a controlling role through practicing a democratic
monitoring of all EU other institutions; looking at EU citizens' petitions and setting up inquires;
questioning the Commission and Council; observing elections and discussing the monetary
policy with the European Central Bank (AGE Platform Europe, 2010).
Lastly, the Parliament’s third function is to give Europeans their right of representation.
In other words, the European Parliament is considered “the voice of the people” who are the
ones who directly elect the Parliament’s members who represent the people’s interests.
Concerning its involvement in the issue of Brexit, the Parliament, theoretically, has a
limited role in negotiations. Nevertheless, the final Brexit agreement will have to be passed by
the Parliament's simple majority vote, or otherwise, there will be no withdrawal agreement.
Consequently, to guarantee the Parliament's approval, the parliament should be deeply
involved in the negotiation process and must be kept fully informed with the negotiation
progress ("European Parliament", n.d.).
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2.4 Conceptual Framework
The United Kingdom-European Union relationship has not been stable since the UK
joined the EEC in 1973. This unstable relationship is the result of many social, economic and
political factors as explained earlier in this chapter. In June 2016, these different motives led
British people to vote to leave the European Union, marking the first incident of a country that
chooses to leave the European Union .
In fact, Brexit is not just an unprecedented phenomenon that is worth to be studied or
analyzed, and it is not only about a vote on the UK’s membership in a 28-country bloc. It is a
critical event that may - on the long-run- have a wider consequences on Britain’s position in
the world as well as the European integration project, and it may also affect the distribution of
power in the international system and the influence of the European Union.
However, while it is still too early to study all these long-run consequences of Brexit,
it is important to study the reasons why the UK decided to leave the EU, how Member States
can leave the Union and how the future relationship after the withdrawal of any member could
be regulated. The first important aspect of Brexit is the internal factors that led British people
and political actors to pressure their government to hold a Brexit referendum in addition to
campaigning and voting against their country’s membership in the bloc .
Secondly, as Brexit is the first case of an EU member to withdraw from the bloc,
studying this event required a very critical and detailed review by scholars to Article 50 TEU
of the Lisbon Treaty that identifies regulations of withdrawal and procedures of negotiating
how should this withdrawal take place. This legal aspect of the Brexit issue is also important
as it is has been the first time to apply this article that has not been applied before since the
Lisbon Treaty entered into force. It is substantial to understand and analyze how a Member
State can leave the Union and how can they regulate their future relations, as this does not only
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affects the two parties’ future relationship, but it may also have an impact on the bloc itself and
its ultimate objective of boosting integration between its members .
A third important dimension of studying Britain’s withdrawal from the EU is the
difficult negotiations process of this withdrawal. To leave the EU, there needs to be a process
of negotiations between the exiting member, the United Kingdom and the European Union to
agree on how the withdrawal should happen in addition to how the multifaceted future
relationship between London and Brussels should be regulated. The challenge here is that the
UK government does not negotiate with only one party that is the EU, but practically, it is a
multilateral negotiation where the government negotiates with the EU officials on one side and
the UK political parties one the other side .
The UK-EU negotiations are based on extremely different objectives and positions.
What the British government ultimately seeks is to agree with the EU officials on a deal that
delivers on the result of the Brexit referendum. This, for the UK, means a deal that ends free
movement of people as well as the jurisdiction of the CJEU over the UK, stops UK’ significant
financial contributions to the EU budget, ensures the government’s freedom to have its
independent trade deals with other countries, and, at the same time, allows London to benefit
from advantages of the bloc’s Single Market in specific areas .
On the other hand, the European Union ultimately seeks to reach a deal that does not
encourage other members to think of exiting the Union and at the same time limit the losses
that will occur as a result of the UK’s withdrawal. In practice, this means a deal that first,
ensures that there would be a cost for the UK’s decision and that EU members cannot simply
leave the Union and still benefit from its many advantages. Second, the EU’s desired deal is a
one that should make the withdrawal process as organized as possible to prevent the potential
repercussions of a “messy” Brexit or a “no-deal” Brexit that experts warn of .
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These extreme positions and objectives are not the only factor that makes Brexit
negotiations difficult. In fact, the internal British divisions on Brexit among the UK’s political
actors makes this process more complicated. Generally, there is a group that calls for what has
been called “hard Brexit”, pressuring for the government to negotiate a Brexit deal that makes
London’s future relationship with Brussels as limited as possible. On the other hand, there is a
second group that supports what has been described as “soft Brexit”, which accepts the UK’s
withdrawal from the Union, but at the same time, calls for maintaining a close relationship
between Britain and the EU to benefit from the latter’s Single Market, agencies and cooperation
programmes .
While this puts the British government in a difficult situation where it is asked to
negotiate conflicting interests with the EU that originally has a different objective and position
from the UK, the divisions among members of the ruling party make the situation even more
difficult. The UK’s Conservative party is divided on Brexit as follows: a group that supports
“hard Brexit”, another group that calls for a “no-deal Brexit”, a third one that demands “softBrexit” and a fourth group that calls the government to hold a new referendum on Brexit.
Thus, all these different positions and objectives of different parties and groups are
expected to affect the negotiators of the UK and EU to reach a final deal that has to be accepted
by the British government, the EU and most importantly, the majority of the British House of
Commons where there has not been a clear majority for any of the above-mentioned views.
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology
3.1 Research Strategy and Data Collection
This study employs a qualitative methodology as it seeks to provide analysis on the
Brexit negotiations, mainly the different interests of the British government and the EU on one
side and the different positions and views of the British political actors on the other side. Due
to the nature of the topic studied and the purpose of this research, the researcher chose to
conduct a qualitative study to be able to review and analyze previous studies that tackle Brexit
and the UK-EU relations as well as recent reports, documents and news on the Brexit
negotiations to see how the previously-mentioned different stances and objectives may affect
the Brexit negotiations.
Qualitative methodology is interpretative in nature. It is used to interpret different
phenomena by using detailed observation and explanation. In addition, it is used when
researchers try to study the whole situation so as to evaluate the complexity of a certain
phenomenon (Atieno, 2009). As explained by Kothari (2004), qualitative methodology is used
when researcher seeks to study or assess attitudes, behaviors or opinions to generate results in
a non-quantitative form. This makes qualitative approach suitable for studying the issue of
Brexit, the different arguments on the UK withdrawal from the EU and the developments of
the negotiations.
This study depends mainly on document analysis and –to a lesser extent- interviewing
to support the analysis of the documents.
3.1.1 First: Document Analysis
Document Analysis as a qualitative research strategy involves a systematic review or
evaluation of different types of documents –whether printed or electronic- materials. This
method requires data to be examined and interpreted by the researcher to deduce meaning,
understand a certain phenomenon and develop empirical knowledge. Document analysis is
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used in combination with other qualitative strategies as a means of triangulation –"the
combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon" (Bowen, 2009, p.28).
Bowen (2009) points out that the document analysis as a qualitative research method can be
used as a method for data triangulation or even as a stand-alone method. Documents help
investigators collect background information in addition to historical insights, which help them
understand the historical roots of certain issues under investigation. Besides, they allow
investigators to track changes and developments, especially when researchers have access to
various documents and can compare them to identify the changes
In this study, the researcher has relied on various types of documents to collect and
analyze data. This included reports issued by research centers and think tanks, books,
dissertations, journal articles, newspapers, press statements and news. Although most of these
documents reviewed had to be recent ones to study such a recent phenomenon, the researcher
also had to rely on some older documents for the literature review and conceptual framework.
These documents were found in libraries and on internet websites and databases, and they
helped the researcher collect information on the history of the UK-EU relationship, the roots
and different arguments on Brexit, the withdrawal procedures to exit the EU and the parties’
different positions in the Brexit talks. In addition, some speeches, remarks and interviews of
political figures and officials have been analyzed to give a comprehensive understanding of the
issue being studied.
There are some advantages for relying on document analysis as a qualitative research
strategy. First, it is an efficient method that requires data selection rather than data collection,
which is less-time consuming. The availability of documents, especially in this age when
almost everything has become available on internet, is another advantage. Third, document
analysis is a cost-effective method; all what the researcher needs is to use the internet or to visit
a library, which is not costly compared with other qualitative methods. Moreover, document
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analysis provides broad coverage in terms of time and events related to the phenomenon or
topic being studied (Bowen, 2009).
3.1.2 Second: In-depth Interviewing
Interviewing as a qualitative research strategy is "a conversation during which the
researcher gathers information by questioning one or more people (respondents)" (Van Thiel,
2014, p.93). It is a flexible research method that allows investigators to collect data through
conducting conversations with the research participants. During these conversations, one can
ask supplementary questions to have a better and fuller understanding of the respondents'
answers (i.e. detailed background information or further explanation to their answers) (Van
Thiel, 2014).
In addition to document analysis, this study required conducting a limited number of
interviews (particularly elite interviewing) to support the information and analysis of the
documents analyzed for this study. As mentioned previously, the purpose of this research is to
explain how the Brexit negotiations work in addition to the different objectives and positions
of the British government, the British parties and the EU and how these differences may affect
the negotiations and the future relationship between London and Brussels. For this purpose,
elite interviews conducted with a number of officials, academics and experts who are following
up closely with the developments of Brexit have enriched the study with different points of
view and perceptions concerning positions of the parties in the negotiations, the redlines of
each side and how the different objectives may affect the final withdrawal deal that Britain and
the EU may reach. Yet, it is important to emphasize here that these interviews were not the
main method for this study, but they were still important to support the document analysis
conducted by the investigator.
This study employed semi-structured interviews that are defined by scholars as a more
flexible version of structured interviews as they allow interviewers to obtain deep information
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by giving them the opportunity to probe and expand the responses of their interviewee's.
Another advantage of using semi-structured interviews is that they are useful in reporting
detailed views of informants and enables them to express their own ideas and feelings
(Alshenqeeti, 2014). In addition, they help the investigator not only to collect very rich
information from his research participants, but also to have an opportunity to ask them followup questions, explore additional information, justify the participants' answers and establish a
link or relation between several topics. Moreover, it helps to create a comfortable atmosphere
for participants, which makes them feel comfortable to engage in a conversation and express
their opinions. Besides, in-depth interviews do not require the participation of a high number
of participants, but only a few and carefully chosen ones are enough to provide useful and
relevant insights (Almeida, 2017).
Given these strengths of in-depth interviews and the fact that the majority of the
research participants are officials or senior experts who are usually cautious when asked to give
their opinions or participate in an inetrview on such a critical topic, the semi-structured
interviews were very useful in data collection in this study. They helped the researcher engage
the participants in interactive discussions where they were able to give their opinions and views
on Brexit and its negotiations accurately with the ability to use their own expressions and words
without being limited to choose between certain answers.
For the purpose of this study, the researcher needed to conduct a total number of 5
interviews with officials and experts in the field who are working on the issue of Brexit. Due
to the political sensitivity of the topic being studied and the cautiousness of officials to release
information or conduct interviews on Brexit and its updates, the researcher could not obtain
first-hand information from officials who are directly involved in the Brexit negotiations. In
addition to the political sensitivity and the nature of this recent issue, the researcher has not
managed to reach offices of British or EU officials who are involved or at least are highly
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informed about the negotiations because of the high cost of travelling to Europe as well as the
time limitations.
Thus, the researcher resorted to Egyptian diplomats who are based in London and
Brussels and who are in charge of following up with the issue of Brexit. Moreover, he also has
interviewed a current member of the House of Lords in addition to two British academics
whose research interests lay in the area of EU law and governance; the relationship between
national parliaments and the EU institutions within the context of the decision-making process;
and the developments of the Brexit negotiations.
Due to having limited time in addition to the high cost of travelling, the researcher could
not travel to London or Brussels to conduct these interviews. Therefore, these interviews have
been conducted via video conferences and emails. The researcher relied on note-taking to
document the participants’ answers, tending not tape the interviews so that the participants
would feel more comfortable to take part in the study.

3.2 Sampling
For the purpose of the study, the researcher did not need to conduct many interviews.
He relied on elite interviewing because the nature of the topic and the perceptions on the Brexit
negotiations required highly informed participants to share their views. Accordingly, the
followed sampling approach used in this study is a non-probability purposive sampling.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with two Egyptian diplomats; one of them
is serving in the Egyptian Commercial Office in London, and the other is a First Secretary who
is currently serving in the Egyptian Commercial Office in Brussels. The two participants are
closely following up with the negotiations and developments of Brexit as part of their jobs.
Also, another interview was conducted with a current Liberal Democrat Lord at the British
Parliament who is well-informed about the developments and updates of Brexit. Furthermore,
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the study employs another interview with Professor of EU Law at School of Law of Leicester
University in the UK and who also has a number of publications on Brexit published by the
Economic and Social Research Council that is based in the UK.
Through these interviews, the researcher received first-hand information and views on
the Brexit negotiations and developments from officials and academics who have wide access
to information on Brexit and who –based on the nature of their jobs- meet with British and
European officials who are involved in Brexit.
Table 1: Interviews' details
Interviewee

Place of interview

Date of interview

Duration
interview

Professor of EU Law Video conference
at

University

Leicester,

17 July 2018

30 Minutes

20 July 2018

26 minutes

21 July 2018

30 minutes

of

Adam

Cygan
Member
United
house

of

the Video Conference

Kingdom’s
of

Lords,

Jeremy Purvis
An

Egyptian Phone call

diplomat serving in
the
Commercial

Egyptian
Office

in London.

41

of

First

Secretary Phone call

Mohamed

25 July 2018

30 minutes

Wahish.

He is an Egyptian
Diplomat serving in
the

Egyptian

Commercial

Office

in Brussels
Dr. Tim Oliver, a Email

27 September 2018

Senior Lecturer at the
University

of

Loughborough’s
London Campus.

3.3 Study limitations
One of the major limitations of this study is that the researcher was not able to travel to
meet with European or British officials to interview them on the challenges and developments
of the Brexit negotiations and their views on the future relationship between Britain and the
EU. However, the interviews conducted with the research participants mentioned above, in
addition to the document analysis employed in this study, were gave enough information on
the negotiations and the different stances of the EU and UK in the negotiations.
Two things should be taken into consideration here. First, the study does not require
very technical or secret information on Brexit and the UK-EU relationship. Instead, it focuses
on the views of the interviewed participants on the different interests and perspectives of the
parties involved Brexit, in addition to their views on the post-withdrawal relationship between
Britain and the EU. Second, the purpose of the interviews is to support the information and
41

data in the secondary resources that the study relies on as the main research methodology.
Besides, another purpose of these interviews was to analyze the different perceptions on the
Brexit negotiations and the future EU-UK relationship, especially that these negotiations are
still ongoing and that some developments of these negotiations may take time to be analyzed
and explained in future reports and studies.
Therefore, the researcher believes that conducting interviews with the aforementioned
participants was useful and necessary to provide a wider perspective on Brexit talks in addition
to the future UK-EU relationship when the actual divorce takes place.
Another limitation of the study has been the fact that this study is conducted in limited
time that coincides with the Brexit negotiations that have witnessed a significant progress, but
have not been finished yet. Therefore, the nature of the topic and the developments in the
negotiations should be taken into consideration when reading the analysis that this study
provides.

3.4 Ethical considerations
Since the study required conducting a number of interviews as a source of primary data,
the researcher has carefully followed the instructions of the Institutional Review Board (IRB)
of AUC and provided the research participants with consent forms to provide them with all the
information they needed to know about the research before starting the interview. In addition,
the researcher tended to explain the purpose and focus of the study verbally and asked the
interviewees to read carefully and sign the consent forms prior to the interviews.
Furthermore, for the sake of participants' comfort in taking part of this research, the
researcher reassured the participants that their names would not be mentioned if they do not
prefer to in order to ensure that they give their opinions freely. Although the interviews did not
aim at reaching confidential information or data, but the researcher still found that anonymity
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of the participants would ensure their comfort and encourage them to provide their views and
perceptions on the topic studied. In fact, only one participant out of the 5 participants preferred
not to be named.
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Chapter 4: The procedures of exiting the European Union

In this chapter, the investigator explains in details how the withdrawal process should
work. The chapter focuses mainly on Article 50 TEU of the Lisbon Treaty that is the first article
of EU treaties to introduce the right to withdraw to the EU Member States. The first section
sheds light on the withdrawal process before the Lisbon Treaty and the previous attempts to
introduce this right in the so-called the EU Constitutional Treaty that did not enter into force.
The following section offers a comprehensive interpretation to Article 50 TEU, explaining the
procedures that the country and the Union should go through in case of the withdrawal of one
of the members. In addition, the third and fourth sections of the chapter deal with the problems
and criticisms addressed to the Article, including the short period of time for the negotiations
and the ambiguous wording of some parts of the Article, that makes it unclear on some issues
such as the possibility to revoke a withdrawal notification and the number of agreements that
should be concluded by the EU and the exiting member.

4.1 Withdrawal before the Lisbon Treaty
In fact, the Treaty of Lisbon was the first EU treaty or document that gives Member
States the right to withdraw from the Union and specifies the procedures that the exiting
member and the EU should go through when a member chooses to withdraw, which will be
explained in details in the following section. However, some scholars tackle the debate on
whether - before December 2007 when the Treaty of Lisbon was signed - the EU members had
the right to withdraw from the EU (or its predecessor organizations) under international law,
particularly, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
Oomens (2017) for example, refer to three articles of the VCLT that some scholars use
as an argument that before the Lisbon Treaty, the EU members could withdraw from the EU
(or its predecessor organizations). For instance, Article 54 of the VCLT, states that termination
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of a treaty or the withdrawal of one of its parties can take place if this comes in conformity
with the treaty’s provisions, or at any time as long as all the parties to the treaty agree.
Moreover, Article 56 of the Convention states that in case a treaty includes no provision on the
withdrawal of its parties, an implicit right for parties to withdraw or terminate a treaty if this
right can be implied by the nature of the treaty. Also, the VCLT’s Article 62 gives parties to
treaties the right to withdraw unilaterally in case “a fundamental change of circumstances” take
place.
Nonetheless, many scholars and experts rejected the argument that the withdrawal or
termination cases mentioned in the VCLT could be applied on the EU or its predecessor
communities (Oomens, 2017). Moreover, according to Poptcheva (2016):
The application of international law to fill in alleged gaps in the EU Treaties has been often
seen as flawed, due to the specific character of the EU as a supranational organisation that drew
from international law for its own creation but then established an autonomous legal order with
its own rules. (p. 2)
This shows that experts considered the nature of the EU treaties that sought to establish
an autonomous and supranational authority that has objectives and certain rules to achieve
them. The ultimate objective of this authority is to strengthen integration and boost cooperation
among members. Thus, one can argue that withdrawal cases mentioned by the VCLT could not
be applied to EU treaties whose aims and goals are against the withdrawal of the members.
Some scholars believe that the EU/EC treaties have been silent on the issue of the
members’ withdrawal because this contradicted with the nature of the European integration
project and the EU and its predecessor organizations as supranational entities that imposed
permanent limitations on some of the sovereign rights of their members (Gatti, 2017). In other
words, as Oomens (2017) explains, the EU/EC Member States found that explaining and
facilitating the procedures for a member to withdraw was not in consistency with the ultimate
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objective of the members to strengthen and expand the European integration. In addition,
Oliver (2013) claims that the main reason behind the negligence of this article was that the EU
–before the Treaty of Lisbon- had fears that including explicit procedures of withdrawal in any
of its treaties could encourage members to use this right to withdraw as a tool to pressure the
bloc in case they fail to impose a certain decision or policy in any issue, which would have
hindered the progress of the bloc towards more policies of integration.
It is true that the Lisbon Treaty was the first EU official treaty that introduced the right
of an EU member to withdraw and the procedural requirements, but it is worthy to clarify here
that before the Lisbon Treaty, the draft Constitutional Treaty or the “Treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe (TCE)”, particularly Article I-60, included a provision on the
possibility of withdrawal and its procedures. Yet, the inclusion of this provision was met by
opposition for different reasons, according to Oomens (2017). First, the EU Commission, was
concerned that such a provision will open the door for members to threaten that they would
leave in case they fail to convince others with their policies or demands. Another reason for
objecting the provision on withdrawal was the concern that Eurosceptic members may use it to
leave the bloc but still benefit from some of its economic advantages provided by the European
Economic Area (EEA) for example. Thirdly, some members such as Ireland and Denmark
objected the inclusion of the withdrawal article in the TCE in order not to give the Eurosceptic
groups in these countries the chance to use it to pressure their governments.
Regardless of the different positions over Article I-60 of the Constitutional Treaty that
was drafted between 2002 and 2003, the proposed treaty did not enter into force since it was
rejected by France and Netherlands in the national referenda that the governments of the two
countries held on the Treaty. Consequently, in 2007, serious work was carried out by the
members to draft a new treaty that would replace all previous treaties of the EU. This effort
resulted in drafting and signing the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2007. And with regard to
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Article I-60 of the TCE, it was replaced by Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty (Cuyvers, 2017;
Oomens, 2017; Staab, 2013).

4.2 The treaty of Lisbon and the procedures of withdrawal from the EU
In December 2007, the heads of state and government of the EU signed the Treaty of
Lisbon that came to replace the Constitutional Treaty that was objected by some members. The
new Treaty is divided into two parts; the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The main objective of the Lisbon Treaty
was to reform the functioning of the Union and its bodies, especially after the two waves of
enlargement since 2004 that increased the number of the EU members from 15 to 27. The treaty
entered into force in December 2009, introducing many significant institutional and
organizational changes in EU, including the inclusion of a withdrawal article that guarantees
the members the right to leave from the Union as well as the procedures of the exiting process
(Staab, 2013; "The Lisbon Treaty", 2008).
In five clauses, Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty has introduced EU law mechanism of
the process of exiting the Union. The first clause of the Article came to guarantee the Member
States the right of withdrawal from the Union in accordance with their own “constitutional
requirements”. According to this part of the Article, unlike the unilateral withdrawal from
treaties under the International Law, Member States of the EU are not required to provide their
reasons when they want to withdraw. The only requirement is that this decision has to be in
accordance with the exiting state’s constitutional requirements (Oomens, 2017; Poptcheva,
2016).
The inclusion and affirmation of the members’ right to withdraw in this Lisbon Treaty
was important for many reasons. One reason is that it was a clear message that the EU
recognizes the sovereignty of its Member States and considers them the “Masters of the
Treaty”, ensuring them the right to withdraw at any time. Moreover, this recognition has been
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seen by some experts as a legitimization of a deeper European integration. Given that members
now have the right to leave, any expanded or deeper integration would always show an implicit
consent of the members (Cuyvers, 2017).
Secondly, Article 50.2 makes clear that the withdrawal procedure would be officially
initiated when the Member State that decides to quit sends a notification in writing to the
European Council, which has been done by the UK government on 29 March 2017.
Accordingly, the Union shall commence its negotiations with the exiting state to conclude a
withdrawal agreement based on the guidelines that the European Council (without the
participation of the exiting member) designs in accordance with Article 218(3) of the TEFU.
This agreement should also cover the future relationship between the departing member and
the Union.
It should be clarified here that the timing of notifying the EU with this decision is
completely in the hand of the exiting member and that this step does not have to be done
immediately after the country fulfils the constitutional requirements to withdraw (Poptcheva,
2016). In the Brexit case, the British government triggered Article 50 TEU officially in March
2017, while the results of the national referendum were officially announced in June 2016
(Foster, 2018). Analysts explain that the time before triggering the withdrawal may give the
exiting country the opportunity to prepare itself for the withdrawal negotiations through having
informal discussions with the other Member States or officials of the EU institutions
(Poptcheva, 2016).
Article 50.3 and 50.4 tackle what happens after a withdrawal agreement between the
exiting country and the EU is concluded. According to 50.3 TEU, once the agreed withdrawal
agreement/s enter into force, the exiting member will no longer abide by the treaties of the
Union that it was obliged to apply before. Taking into consideration the complexity of such an
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agreement due to the deep integration of the Union, the article gives the two sides a period of
two years to negotiate their different interests and objectives so that they can reach a mutually
agreed withdrawal agreement/s that also would cover the different aspects and domains of their
future relationship.
Obviously, during the two-year period of negotiations (that can be extended if the
withdrawing country and the European Council unanimously decide to), the member seeking
to withdraw from the Union would still enjoy all its rights and powers and would be committed
to all its responsibilities and obligations as a full EU Member State, until the withdrawal
agreement enters into force. However, the only exception according to Article 50.4 TEU is that
during the negotiations period (whether two years or more), the UK has no right to participate
in any formal discussions or decisions in the European Council dealing with Brexit (Oliver,
2013; Oomens, 2017).
Article 50.4 TEU also states that for the EU, the withdrawal agreement that may be
reached during the negotiations period has to be approved by a “Qualified Majority” of the
European Council in accordance with Article 238.3(b) TFEU. According to this article, a
“Qualified Majority Vote” of the Council requires the voting of at least 72% of Council’s
Member States that represent at least 65% of these states’ total populations (excluding the
withdrawing state). This means that at least 20 members of the 27 EU Member States should
vote for the agreement (Nystrom, 2017; Oliver, 2013).
In case the Council rejects the proposed withdrawal agreement, the country that wants
to leave can still leave the Union. “The wording of Article 50 places no obligation on the UK
to negotiate, only an obligation on the Council to do so” (Oliver, 2013, p 13). This means that
according to Article 50, negotiating a withdrawal agreement is not a precondition for a country
to leave the EU, which means that if the European Council rejects the proposed agreement, this

49

should not prevent the UK from leaving. And in this case, the UK-EU relationship would be
akin to the relationship of the Union and any other state that is a member of the World Trade
Organization (Oliver, 2013).
Lastly, Lisbon Treaty’s Article 50.5 makes clear that after the withdrawal, if the country
that has withdrawn would like to join the Union again, it will be treated like any other non-EU
country that seek to become and EU member. Therefore, the country that has already
withdrawn would follow the accession procedures that are mentioned in Article 49 of the same
treaty.
Although Article 50 TEU of the Lisbon Treaty is in general clear on many of the
specific procedures that a withdrawing member would have to go through to leave the EU,
scholars and experts still refer to some of the problems in this article, which will be discussed
in the coming section of this chapter.

4.3 Problems of Article 50 TEU of the Lisbon Treaty
The UK decision to the leave the European Union was the reason why many scholars
have been analysing and looking carefully into the Lisbon Treaty’s Article 50 over the past two
years. Unlike the accession to the EU, the withdrawal, according to Article 50 TEU, does not
seem to be complicated, neither does it require the fulfilment of many requirements. However,
in many studies, experts have referred to some problems with this article concerning the short
period of negotiations, the wording in some of the Article’s clauses that may be confusing and
the possibility of revoking the withdrawal notification.
The first problem with Article 50 TEU that many experts and scholars highlight is the
relatively short period of negotiations to reach a withdrawal agreement. There is a wide
agreement in different studies and reports that the two-year negotiations period is too short to
discuss and negotiate the various aspects of the future relationship between the EU and one of
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its members after the latter exists (Nystrom, 2017, Oomens, 2017). Trying to explain the
possible reason behind this very limited time, Cuyvers (2017) states that most likely, this was
done on purpose “to make the process of leaving the EU unattractive” (p. 38), as the member
that wants to leave the EU would find itself in a difficult position in the negotiations that have
to be concluded in only two years.
A counterargument here may be that the negotiations period could be extended
according to Article 50.3. Yet, the condition to extend the two-year period is practically
difficult to be met as the article makes clear that the withdrawing state and the European
Council “unanimously” have to agree on extending Article 50. Otherwise, the two-year
negotiation’s period can never be extended. At this critical time, some scholars argue that it is
less likely that this unanimity would exist as any of the EU members may face strong pressures
that may affect its decision (Syrpis, 2016). In other words, while theoretically, the negotiation’s
period could be extended until the two sides settle all issues that need to be resolved for a future
relationship agreement, the political reality make this extension too difficult to happen.
Furthermore, the ambiguity of this clause represents another challenge to the possibility
of extending the negotiation’s period. Some opinions refer to the fact that the Article 50.3 has
not specified “how much time and how many times this period can be extended” (Oomens,
2017, p. 25). Consequently, it can be argued that in case the condition on extending Article 50
is met, another disagreement among the EU members concerning the extension period and the
number of extensions that the exiting country could be given may arise, which would hinder
the negotiations and make the situation more complex.
Although Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty did not include any clauses on the possibility
of revoking the withdrawal notification, many scholars have tackled this issue, considering the
possibility that during the negotiations period that may take more than two years, the exiting
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country may want to change its decision for many reasons such as the coming into power of a
new government with different policies, a serious economic shocks that may happen and force
the exiting country to change its decision, etc (The UK in a Changing Europe, 2016).
The ambiguity on this matter is another problem of the Lisbon Treaty’s Article 50 that
resulted in a debate trying to answer the question on the possibility of revoking a withdrawal
notification during the two-year period of negotiations. On one hand, a group of scholars go
for the opinion that if a state decides to revoke its withdrawal notification during the two-year
negotiation period, then it may do so and it will continue to be an EU member. While this is
not directly mentioned in Article 50 TEU, those who support this opinion believe that rejecting
the revocation of a withdrawing member that changed its mind would contradict with the EU’s
policy of an “ever closer union” as well as the bloc’s obligations to strengthen cooperation
between its members (Cuyvers, 2017). Therefore, they assume, the Union would not reject the
country’s request to revoke its withdrawal notification.
Moreover, other experts believe that a withdrawing country that changes its mind can
stay in the EU based on the fact that the main aim of any treaty in general, and the EU treaties
in particular, is to keep its members as parties to the treaty, which suggests that a withdrawing
member that have already sent its withdrawal notification can revoke this notification and stay
in the Union without having to apply to re-join the EU. What makes this opinion more
convincing is the fact that the exiting EU member has, according to Article 50 TEU, to abide
by all the EU treaties till the very last moment before its actual withdrawal. Also, if it actually
withdraws, then it has to apply and go through the accession procedures of the EU if it wants
to re-join the Union. Hence, it is more convincing to argue that during the period between
sending the withdrawal notification and the actual withdrawal of the country, the exiting
member can revoke its notification and stay at the Union. (Wyatt, 2016 as cited in Miller, Lang
& Simson-Caird, 2017).
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On the other hand, another group of experts such as Gatti (2017) see that the unilateral
stop of the withdrawal process is not an implied right of the departing member according to the
Lisbon Treaty’s Article 50. He claims that if an EU member state knows that it can unilaterally
stop the withdrawal, it would not be negotiating in good faith with the EU, knowing that it can
end the negotiation when it goes in a direction that this member does not want. In addition, the
researcher stresses that the wording of the Article 50 TEU makes it clear that once a withdrawal
notification is invoked, the process would have only one end that is the actual withdrawal of
the member whether it manages to reach an agreement with the EU or not.
However, Gatti (2017) still assumes that while the unilateral termination of Article 50
by the leaving member is very difficult, stopping the withdrawal process is still possible if the
exiting member manages to convince the rest of the EU members to unanimously agree to that,
which may not be an easy task. Poptcheva (2016) supports this opinion and argues that the
withdrawal process could be suspended “if there was mutual agreement between the
withdrawing state, the remaining Member States and the EU institutions, rather than a unilateral
revocation” (p. 5).
A third critical problem that many researchers have referred to is that the Article’s
wording on some vital issues is vague and not definitive, leaving the door open for different,
and sometimes contradicting, interpretations of the Article and consequently the procedures
that shall be followed in the withdrawal process. For instance, Oomens (2017) states that the
provisions of Article 50 TEU “can be interpreted in more than one way and are therefore not
straightforward and in addition, the actual wording of the Article is said to be incomplete or
unclear” (p. 25).
As explained in this part of the chapter, the unclear wording of the Article 50 TEU is
materialized in some debates such as the one on whether a withdrawal notification can be
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rescinded or not. Furthermore, as a result of the unclear wording, there have been a debate on
another matter concerning the scope of the TEU’s withdrawal article and the number of
agreements that the withdrawing country and the EU would need to negotiate. This issue will
be discussed in the forthcoming section.

4.4 Scope of Article 50 TEU and how many agreements should be concluded
As explained in the first section in this chapter, Article 50.2 TEU states that the EU
shall negotiate a withdrawal agreement with the departing state to agree on how and when the
withdrawal happen as well as the framework of the future relationship between the exiting
member and the Union (Nystrom, 2017; The UK in a Changing Europe, 2016). The important
question that this section tries to answer is how many agreements shall be concluded by the EU
and the withdrawing member? And does the scope of the Article 50 TEU cover any agreement
that may be concluded to regulate the two sides’ future relationship? Or is it only limited to the
simple agreement on withdrawal, leaving other issues to be settled by another agreement?
Some experts see that there are no definitive answers to these questions as “the scope
of the withdrawal negotiations can be as narrow or as wide as the negotiators choose, because
Article 50 TEU does not specify how far-reaching a withdrawal agreement should be” (Miller,
Lang & Simson-Caird, 2017, p. 22). This opinion sees that Article 50.2 has not been clear on
the scope of the withdrawal agreement and whether all issues and arrangements related to the
future relationship between the EU and its withdrawing member could be settled in one
agreement or require a separate agreement other than the one of withdrawal.
Yet, the great majority of opinions of academics and experts suggest that looking into
the wider picture of the process and the withdrawal mechanisms set by Article 50 TEU, it is
more conceivable to say that there need to be at least two agreements; one to regulate the
withdrawal of the country that seeks to leave the Union, while the other one, which may take
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longer than two years to be concluded, would tackle the different areas of the future relationship
between the EU and the departing member.
Cuyvers (2017) for example, interprets that Article 50 of the TEU makes it clear that at
least two agreements must be concluded in case of the withdrawal of any member. While the
first agreement should be a simple one that is on the withdrawal itself, a second agreement will
be required to define the new relationship between the EU and the UK (or any other member
that may want to leave in future), he explains. The author argues that because the agreement
on the future relationship between the UK and EU is much more complicated than the
withdrawal agreement in terms of the procedures and substance of each, it is possible that the
latter could be completed before the former.
As the author sees that the two-year negotiation’s period is a short time to conclude
those two agreements, he warns that if the withdrawal agreement enters into force before the
parties manage to conclude their new relationship agreement, Britain will be a de facto non EU
member without a new deal. To avoid this hard Brexit scenario, Cuyvers suggest two options:
whether to link the entry into force of UK's withdrawal agreement to the entry into force of the
second agreement on the new UK-EU relationship, or to draft a third "transitional agreement"
and link it to the withdrawal agreement to regulate the relationship between the two parties
until they manage to conclude a comprehensive agreement on their new relationship after the
divorce.
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Chapter 5: Brexit negotiations
As discussed in the previous chapter, the European Union, according to the Lisbon’s
Treaty Article 50, is responsible for starting negotiations with the exiting member in light of
the guidelines drafted by the European Council. During the period of negotiations, there are
many issues in different sectors that need to be discussed to determine the future relationship
between the withdrawing state and the Union.
In any negotiations, the parties usually have different objectives, visions and stances on
the issues being negotiated. This chapter, therefore, underlines the key issues that have been
addressed in the negotiations as well as the positions of the British government and the
European Union on these issues, which will affect the outcome of the negotiations process and
the final agreement on the future UK-EU relationship.
Moreover, this chapter discusses the different positions of the British political
parties/actors and their contradicting views on Brexit and the ideal future UK-EU relationship.
These local divisions are also important to be analysed because they have a direct effect on the
final agreement/s that the British government and is trying to reach, taking into consideration
that this final agreement should be voted for by the British parliament in order to be effective.

5.1 Issues of the Brexit negotiations and the stances of each party
On 29 April 2017, the European Union announced its guidelines for Brexit negotiations.
This document that was issued by the European Council is a very important document as it
defined the framework for negotiations under Lisbon Treaty’s Article 50 and made clear the
Union’s principles and position in the Brexit talks. One of the core principles that the Union
stated clearly in this announcement was the “phased-approach” of negotiations. The Council
decided that all Brexit issues cannot be discussed together and that there should be phases of
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negotiations to avoid a chaotic Brexit and to minimize the harms of the British withdrawal from
the Union (Foster, 2017).
According to the negotiations’ guidelines, there have been two phases of negotiations.
The first phase discussed withdrawal issues that included citizens’ rights, financial settlements
and the borders between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. After “sufficient
progress” had been achieved in the first phase, the second one has been focusing on negotiating
a comprehensive understanding and a framework for transitional arrangements as well as the
post-withdrawal relationship between the EU and Britain (Poptcheva & Cirlig, 2017; The
European Council, 2017).
On the other hand, the UK’s initial approach was different from the EU’s approach.
The United Kingdom initially wanted to discuss all issues together to avoid being put in a
weaker position compared with the EU’s position in the negotiations. London saw that all
issues should be discussed in parallel, so that it can use its leverage in some areas (like security)
to pressure Brussels to offer concessions in other areas (Patel, 2018).
5.1.1 Phase one
This first phase of Brexit negotiations required the two sides’ negotiators to hold six
rounds of talks over seven months (from June to December 2017). The discussions, as
mentioned above, tackled three critical issues. First, the rights of the EU-27 citizens’ who are
in the UK and the rights of those of the UK who are in any of the EU 27 members. The financial
obligations and commitments incurred by Britain were the second issue. Lastly, the third issue
was about how would the borders between the Republic of Ireland (which is an EU member)
and Northern Ireland (which is part of the UK) would be managed after withdrawal takes place
(Poptcheva & Cirlig, 2017; The European Council, 2017).
a) Citizens’ rights
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First, on citizens’ rights, the dilemma in this issue was about what rights and treatment
that citizens of both sides could enjoy after Brexit takes place, taking into consideration the
significant number of EU citizens living in the UK (estimated to be 3.6 million in 2016) and
the number of British people living in the EU (about 1.2 million in 2015). In addition, another
key problem was which court should arbitrate disputes after the actual leave takes place, taking
into account that the British government would no longer accept the supremacy of the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) (Bennett et al., 2018)
Poptcheva & Cirlig (2017) explain that while the EU wanted citizens (whether of the
UK or EU) to retain their rights under the Union’s laws and regulations (as interpreted by the
CJEU) and to allow free movement after the divorce, the UK, in contrast, wanted to end free
movement of people. The Kingdom suggested that citizens of the EU-27 living in the UK,
regardless of when they came, apply for a “new immigration status under the UK law.”
According to the joint report issued in December 2017 on the progress during phase
one, the two parties reached a compromise on this issue. They agreed that the withdrawal
agreement would preserve certain rights deriving from the EU law, particularly, the right of the
EU citizens and the UK citizens as well to continue studying, working and living in their host
state even after the actual withdrawal. They agreed also to confer those citizens the rights they
used to have under the EU treaties and “the Free Movement Directive 38/2004” as interpreted
by the CJEU. The negotiators agreed that these laws should be applied for citizens who have
already exercised their right of free movement under the EU law maximum by the date of the
UK’s actual withdrawal.
In addition, the compromise was that for the EU-27 citizens in the UK after the
withdrawal, any residence restrictions (such expulsion or entry ban) in cases related with public
policy or security concerns will be governed by the British not EU laws. Most importantly, the
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joint report on phase one introduced the new “settled status” by which EU citizens –according
to certain criteria and scope detailed in the report- could apply to stay indefinitely by obtaining
“settled status” (Poptcheva & Cirlig, 2017).
b) The Irish borders
The second critical issue addressed in this phase was the borders between the Republic
of Ireland and North Ireland after the UK departures from the bloc. The Irish borders issue is
one of the rare Brexit issues that all parties adopted the same stance on. All parties agreed from
the beginning that there should not be a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland that
would introduce again customs and immigration checkpoints (Miler, 2017).
The issue of the Irish borders is a complicated issue as the UK withdrawal from the EU
would also affect the continuing operation and future implementation of the 1998 Belfast
Agreement (also known as the Good Friday Agreement) between the UK and the Republic of
Ireland that ended almost thirty years of violence and tensions between the conflicting
communities in Northern Ireland; the Protestant Unionists who wanted Northern Ireland to
remain as part of the United Kingdom and the Catholic Republicans who wanted separation
from the UK to join the Republic of Ireland (Serhan, 2018).
Briefly, the problem is that in the Brexit referendum in 2016, unlike the majority in
England, the majority in Northern Ireland (55.8%) voted to remain in the EU. By this vote, the
multifaceted relations and cooperation between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland
have been threatened by the UK’s decision to exit the EU, and consequently, its Single Market
or Customs Union (Poptcheva & Cirlig, 2017). Therefore, to avoid any political or economic
implications that would affect the Belfast Agreement, London and Brussels in many occasions
stressed that they would try to ensure that the Agreement is not affected by Brexit.
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The EU in its negotiations’ guidelines issued in April 2018 made clear that “the Good
Friday Agreement ‘in all its parts’ and the peace process should be protected” (Phinnemore &
Hayward, 2017, p.12). Also, the British government emphasized that the Good Friday
Agreement “must be considered and safeguarded throughout the withdrawal process”
(Phinnemore & Hayward, 2017, p.12). In addition to other statements by officials from both
sides as well as Irish officials, these examples showed that all parties were keen on ensuring
that during negotiations, there should be an agreement to avoid hard borders.
According to the joint report on the progress of the negotiations’ phase one, the British
and European negotiators agreed to some principles and commitments that should be turned
into detailed arrangements in the second phase of negotiations and that should ensure the full
implementation and protection of all aspects of the Belfast Agreement. For example, the agreed
that in all circumstances, regardless of the future relationship between London and Brussels,
all aspects of the Good Friday Agreement would still be applied. They also agreed that the UK
should avoid any measures that may lead to a hard border on the island of Ireland. The UK
government, in addition, committed to preserve “full alignment” to the EU’s rules of the
Internal Market and Customs Union in case it fails to propose specific and practical solutions
to protect the North-South cooperation and flexible borders in the island of Ireland (Poptcheva
& Cirlig, 2017).
c) Financial settlements
The third key issue discussed in phase one of Brexit talks was the financial settlements
or what has been known in the media as the “divorce bill”. The two expressions, briefly, refer
to the United Kingdom’s financial obligations as a member of the European Union. Although
the UK is leaving the EU, it still has to fulfil its financial obligations that it committed to during
its membership of the Union. In fact, due to the “multiannual nature” of the Union’s various
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projects and programmes, the EU members usually make decisions of long-term plans that
impose financial liabilities on them over a number of years (D’Alfonso et al., 2017).
Many experts considered this subject as one of the most contentious issues in the
negotiations. Poptcheva and Cirling (2017) and illustrate that while the EU made clear from
the beginning (particularly in the negotiations’ guidelines document) that the financial
commitments made by the EU 28 members must be delivered by the EU-28, the UK has not
recognized these financial obligations towards the Union after withdrawal until the first phase
of negotiations was concluded. Moreover, although in September 2018, the British government
vowed to respect its financial commitments towards the EU, it did not define what these
commitments were, which added to the ambiguity of the British stance. In addition, what made
the situation more complicated was that while London wanted to link the financial settlement
to a transition period following the actual divorce, Brussels, in contrast, insisted that the
financial obligations should not be linked to any other discussions or arrangements.
The negotiations’ phase one resulted in a principle agreement by both sides to a
methodology to calculate the financial settlement, including the bill’s items, the principles for
calculating them and how should this bill be paid (D’Alfonso et al., 2017; Poptcheva and
Cirling 2017). According to the joint report, the UK should still contribute to the EU’s budgets
for 2019 and 2020. Britain, in addition, committed to pay its share of other financial
commitments and liabilities that were agreed upon by the EU-28 to be completed by the end
of 2020. Also it agreed to pay its contribution to the Union’s contingent liabilities (such as staff
pensions). Lastly, the parties agreed that these payments related to the financial settlement
agreement will be delivered by the UK when they become due and that these payments will be
paid in Euro (House of Commons of the United Kingdom, 2018). Although the joint report did
not specify the exact amount of the financial commitments for the UK, the total divorce bill for
the Kingdom was estimated by some to be about 40-45 billion Euros (Mix, 2018).
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In addition to the three key issues discussed above, there have been other withdrawal
issues that the two parties could not reach a final agreement on; yet, they agreed on some
aspects thereof. Among these issues are the Euratom-related matters, mutual judicial and police
cooperation in criminal matters, issues related to civil and commercial cooperation and issues
related to the functioning of European Union’s agencies and institutions ((Bennett et al., 2018;
Poptcheva and Cirling, 2017).
5.1.2 Phase two
After the UK and EU negotiators had stated in their joint report in December 2017 that
“sufficient progress” has been made in negotiating the priority issues of phase one, the second
phase of Brexit talks started, seeking to reach an overall understanding on the framework of
the EU-UK future relationship in addition to time-limited transitional arrangements (The
European Council, 2017). Unlike phase one that focused on certain issues, phase two has been
much more complicated as it sought to reach a more comprehensive withdrawal deal that would
regulate the post-Brexit relationship between the two sides in addition to the terms of
withdrawal.
With regard to the future economic partnership between London and Brussels, the
positions of the two parties have been different, taking into consideration the parties’ different
interests and objectives. For the UK, the British interests and position in the negotiations have
been stated clearly in the statements and speeches of the British officials, especially the Prime
Minister, in addition to some key documents such as the so-called White Papers issued by the
government in February and July 2018. On its turn, the EU, particularly the European Council
has issued guidelines by which it presented its objectives and redlines for the negotiations.
The main goal for the UK in the second phase’s talks has been to negotiate an ambitious
free trade agreement (FTA), hoping that the agreement would allow for free trade in goods and
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services between London and Brussels and include new customs arrangements with the EU
(Cîrlig & Puccio, 2018).
The European Union, on the other hand, has expressed recognition to the results of the
Brexit referendum, believing that the UK’s withdrawal process has to be organized. The EU’s
main goal has been to ensure that the UK’s withdrawal from the Union will not inspire other
Eurosceptic movements and parties to pressure their governments to exit the Union. Brussels
wants to avoid a scenario in which the British government could retain all the benefits it wants
and at the same time withdraw from obligations that it does not like, which would be an
incentive for other Member States to threaten to leave the EU in case they want to opt-out from
certain obligations (Patel, 2018).
a) Transitional/Implementation period
In September 2017, the UK Prime Minister, Theresa May delivered a speech on the
UK-EU future relationship and Brexit negotiations. In her speech, May stated clearly that she
seeks to agree with the EU on a time-limited implementation period (transitional period) during
which the two sides would have a chance to smoothly implement the arrangements for the UK
withdrawal. She said that a two-year transitional period would be enough.
There was no differences between the UK and EU on this matter. In January 2018, the
European Council announced the EU’s vision on the transitional period. It stated that the
transitional period should start from the day the withdrawal agreement enters into force and
that this period should end maximum by 31 December 2020. Assuming that the UK would
leave on 29 March 2019, this means that the implementation period will be about 20 months,
which is not greatly different than what the UK government wanted (House of Commons of
the United Kingdom, 2018).
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But in fact, the talks on the transitional period were not only limited to how long should
it be, but, most importantly, they were also about the rules and regulations that should be
applied during those 21 transitional months. The EU’s position was that it wanted its rules and
regulations should be applied in many sectors during the 20-month implementation period. For
example, the European Council made clear in its guidelines for the second phase of Brexit
negotiations (issued in December 2017) that “all existing Union regulatory, budgetary,
supervisory, judiciary and enforcement instruments and structures will apply, including the
competence of the CJEU” (Poptcheva and Cirling, 2017, p. 10).
Furthermore, the Council’s guidelines also highlighted that as Britain would continue
to be in the EU’s Customs Union and Single Market during the implementation period, it has
to “comply with EU trade policy, to apply EU customs tariff and collect EU customs duties,
and to ensure all EU checks are being performed on the border vis-à-vis other third countries”
(European Council, 2017, para. 4).
Besides, the European Council’s guidelines have also underlined that the UK would not
have a say in formulating or voting on these laws that it would have to accept during the 21
months of the transitional period. The UK “will no longer participate in or nominate or elect
members of the EU institutions, nor participate in the decision-making of the Union bodies,
offices and agencies” (European Council, 2017, para. 3).
On the other side, before the EU announced these guidelines, Theresa May had
expressed her government’s willingness to accept the EU rules in her speech in September
2017. She emphasized that “current terms” of the EU for market accessing as well as the
Union’s rules and regulations should prevail during the 21-month transitional period. However,
on the free movement, her initial position was that starting from 29 March 2019, all new arrivals
from the EU should be registered to be able to come, live or work in the UK (Henley, 2017).

64

b) Future economic partnership

The British Prime Minister, in March 2018 presented her vision on the future UK-EU
relationship, emphasizing that she seeks “the broadest and deepest possible partnership—
covering more sectors and co-operating more fully than any Free Trade Agreement anywhere
in the world today” (Mix, 2018, p. 8). This means that the UK government was actually seeking
a customized or tailored economic relationship with the bloc rather than choosing one from the
already-existing models (such as a free trade agreement like the Canadian model or the
membership of the European Economic Area of the Norwegian model) (Mix, 2018).
When asked about the UK’s desired agreement, Professor of EU Law at University of
Leicester, Adam Cygan argued that the already-existing models will not be accepted by the
British government. For instance, he clarified, the Canadian model would not be useful for the
British economy as it focuses mainly on trade in goods, while it covers a limited number of
services, which represent almost 80% of the British economy. In addition, Cygan also stressed
that the UK cannot also accept the so-called Norwegian model that first, does not cover some
important sectors of trade in goods such as fisheries and agricultural products, and second,
requires free movement people and obliges London to accept the EU rules and regulations,
without having any influence on these laws.
In the so-called “White Paper” issued by the British government in July 2018, London
advocated for a future relationship with the EU that would be structured around economic and
security partnership in addition to cooperation in some other important domains such as science
and innovation, culture and education, fisheries and protection of personal data (Cîrlig &
Puccio, 2018).
For the economic partnership, July’s White Paper and the statement agreed by the
British Cabinet at Chequers in the same month made clear that the UK wanted and FTA-based
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relationship with the EU. It suggested a free trade area for goods with no tariffs, no quota or
requirements of rules of origin for the UK-EU goods, including agri-food goods (George et al.,
2018). The British document also proposed a “common rulebook” for these goods. This
rulebook is about “the standards and regulations followed by all EU Member States and nonEU EEA States and facilitates the functioning of the Single Market in goods and services”
(Fella, Miller, De Mars & Curtis, 2018, p.5). These agreed standards and regulations cover a
wide range of areas that include, for example, health, automotive, emissions, environmental
protection, pharmaceuticals and food safety.
Besides, to avoid UK-EU customs barriers, the UK government proposed a new
“facilitated customs arrangements” (FCA) by which the UK imposes the EU duties on goods
going to the EU and UK tariffs on goods going to the British market. This proposal by the UK
intended to facilitate frictionless trade between the UK and EU and at the same time, it should
achieve what the UK wants by leaving the Single Market (Cîrlig & Puccio, 2018; Walker
2018).
As for trade in services, which is vital for the British economy, the UK wanted an
agreement that is even more flexible than any current arrangements that Brussels has with any
non-EU countries, and at the same time still not equivalent to what the UK enjoys as an EU
member (George et al., 2018). Britain also wanted the new arrangements on services to ensure
the freedom of the government to “to chart its own path in the areas that matter most for its
economy” (Walker, 2018, para. 12).
As part of the UK’s proposed partnership with the EU, the White Paper suggested the
participation of Britain in the EU agencies; particularly the ones that are relevant to the free
trade area for goods such as the “European Chemical Agency” and the “European Medicines
Agency”. By this proposal, the government tried to fulfil the demands of businesses that need
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facilitated access to the EU market. Not only that, but the White Paper has also accepted that
the British government would make financial contributions to these agencies and that it would
have no rights to vote on matters related to the way these agencies run their businesses (Cîrlig
& Puccio, 2018, George et al., 2018, Morris, 2018).
Another key issue that has been focused on in phase two of the negotiations was the
free movement of people. The White Paper of the British government tried to get the best deal
for the UK citizens and businesses, and at the same time end free movement (which was one
of the main reasons why the majority of the British voters voted to leave and one of the British
government’s redlines in the negotiations). The Paper affirmed that “any future mobility
arrangements will be consistent with the ending of free movement, respecting the UK’s control
of its borders and the government’s objective to control and reduce net migration”
(Government of the United Kingdom, 2018, p. 32).
What the UK also proposed for the free movement of people was to apply “reciprocal
arrangements” such as those related with certain benefits and social security. Among other
arrangements, the White Paper proposed to allow citizens to travel without visa for tourism and
temporary business activities as well as allowing students to study abroad (Morris, 2018,
Walker, 2018).
The EU, in fact, did not accept the British ambitious plan to have an economic
partnership that gives London more advantages than other non-EU countries that have trade
agreements with the bloc. This future UK-EU economic and trade relationship that the UK
government envisioned was seen “unrealistic” by the EU (Mix, 2018). Some analysts explain
that the UK’s approach of trying to sustain close relationship with the EU in certain economic
areas and to eliminate it in other areas was already ruled out by Brussels according to different
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statements of EU officials as well as the bloc’s guidelines for Brexit negotiations (Payne,
Bienkov & Colson, 2018).
For Brussels, the UK can only choose between either being a member of the EU’s
Single Market based on an EEA agreement (known as the Norwegian model) or a more limited
FTA (similar to the Canadian Economic and Trade Agreement with the Union). In other words,
the EU wanted to ensure that the balance between rights and obligations is maintained and that
the UK would not receive certain privileges without committing to its obligations. The EU,
therefore, limited the choices available for the UK; whether to enjoy the benefits of the Single
Market and respect its obligations, including the free movement and budgetary contributions,
or a limited access to the Market with more regulatory sovereignty and autonomy for the British
government (Patel, 2018).
Tackling the issue of the Irish borders in the second phase’s talks, the UK’s objective
from the beginning was to avoid hard borders between Ireland and Northern Ireland.
Nonetheless, analysts see that May did not offer a practical solution for the Irish borders’ issue
after Britain leaves the customs union and Single Market. May reiterated in her speech in March
that the UK government was still committed to avoiding hard borders between Ireland and
Northern Ireland (Payne, 2018a). She also expressed clearly her rejection to the EU suggestion
to solve this issue by calling for Northern Ireland to remain within the bloc’s customs union
and to abide by the rules of the Single Market after Brexit, which would avoid hard borders in
the island of Ireland (Payne, 2018b).
This stance has been reaffirmed in the UK’s White Paper in July. It emphasized
London’s commitment to protect the peace process and the open borders in the island of Ireland
in addition to protecting the economic and constitutional integrity of the United Kingdom. The
Paper stated clearly that London will agree with Brussels on a “backstop” plan to be applied in
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case the two parties could not manage to reach other alternative solutions for the issue of Irish
borders (Government of the United Kingdom, 2018).
Nevertheless, the EU still suggested to keep Northern Ireland in the EU customs union,
aligned with the rules of the bloc’s internal market on goods to avoid customs and regulatory
checks at the Irish borders (Patel, 2018).

5.2 British divisions over Brexit
During the debates on the desired UK-EU relationship after London withdraws from
the European Union, terms of “soft Brexiters” and “hard Brexiters” appeared and have been
used to refer to the positions of political actors in the UK on Brexit and how the future
relationship between the UK and EU should be.
“Hard Brexiteers” are those who prioritise Britain’s full control over its borders, reject
compromises with Brussels on issues like free movement of people and prefer the UK to make
new trade deals and apply its own laws. This group, therefore, prefers the UK to leave the
Single Market and customs union of the EU. On the contrary, “soft Brexiteers” and those who
initially wanted the UK to stay in the EU (the so-called remainers) have expressed support to
maintain a close relationship with the EU after Brexit which means that they accept paying
financial contributions to the EU and allowing free movement in exchange for the UK remain
in and benefit from the EU’s Single Market (Hunt & Wheeler, 2018; Sims, 2016).
In fact, the actual situation in the UK has been more complicated than this. Political
parties and Members of Parliament (MPs) are strongly divided to the extent that one can even
see these divisions inside the same party. When asked about the situation in the British House
of Commons, Liberal Democrat Lord, Jeremy Purvis said “the UK was in a fluid situation” and
that “there [was] no clear majority in the House of Commons for any of the [Brexit] options”
that have been proposed during the negotiations.
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The Conservative party issued a 12-point statement on its stance on Brexit negotiations
in January 2017, describing this 12-point plan as “the right Brexit.” The ruling party expressed
in this statement that it supports the end of free movement and the UK “taking back control of
its borders.” To restore the supremacy of the British courts (which is considered an integral
part of the UK sovereignty), the party made clear that they support ending the supremacy of
the CJEU in the UK. The Tory party has also emphasized that the British government should
stop contributing significant amounts of money to the EU budget so as to spend this money on
the priorities of the British people. Besides, the party also called for frictionless trade in goods
and flexible trade in services between London and Brussels, security cooperation with the EU
and leaving the Union’s common agricultural policy and common fisheries policy. In addition,
the conservatives have also called for a Brexit that ensure the UK would be free to have an
independent foreign and defence policy as well as ensuring that no hard borders would be
introduced in the island of Ireland or between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. Most
importantly, the party expressed its rejection to postponing the UK’s departure from the Union,
stating clearly the UK should leave the European Union by 29 March 2019 ("Where UK parties
stand on Brexit", 2017).
On the other hand, the opposition Labour Party’s initial position was to stay in the
European Union. However, the party respected the results of the referendum afterwards, but
unlike the Conservative Party, the Labours have been supporting “soft Brexit”. They have been
calling for protecting workers’ rights and a “tariff-free access” to the EU Internal Market.
Furthermore, the opposition party has rejected the calls for a second referendum on Brexit as
well as rejecting leaving the EU without a deal; a scenario that many experts and scholars
argued would result in serious problems for both London and Brussels. Unlike the Tory party,
the Labour party have not called for limiting the number of EU migrants to Britain ("Where
UK parties stand on Brexit", 2017).
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Furthermore, there are some other parties represented in the House of Commons who
are calling for a second referendum regardless of their different motives to do so. When asked
in July 2018, Liberal Democrat, Lord Purvis stressed that his party (which is a strong supporter
of remaining in the UK) was calling for a second referendum as a solution for the “deadlock”
and lack of unanimity on any of the Brexit options, including the British White Paper issued in
July 2018. Lord Purvis, nonetheless, recognized that that a second referendum would be very
difficult because the British government clearly rejected this suggestion.
Similarly, the Scottish National Party (SNP), which was a “remain” supporter has been
calling for a special status for Scotland after Brexit in addition to a second independence
referendum for Scotland before the actual Brexit takes place. The SNP wanted Scotland to
remain in the EU’s Single Market. The party believed that the EU membership delivered
significant “social, economic and cultural benefits” for different communities and businesses
in Scotland (Harris, 2018). Also, in October 2018, leader of the party, Nicola Sturgeon affirmed
that the party’s MPs would not back any deal that keeps the UK out of the Single Market and
customs union of the EU and that the party supported second referendum on Brexit ("SNP
would back 'People's Vote' on Brexit", 2018).
It is worthy to highlight that the divisions and different opinions on Brexit have not
been only among the different political actors, but there have been even divisions among
members of the same party, particularly the Conservative party. What makes the situation even
more complicated is the fact that these divisions are not about simply hard and soft Brexit
supporters, but analysts refer to at least five different positions on Brexit inside the Tory party.
For example, there is a group that calls for a no-deal Brexit (about 62 MPs); another group that
supports a hard Brexit; a third group that, in contrast, backs a soft Brexit (around 12 members);
a fourth group of Tory MPs who demand a second referendum on Brexit (around 4 MPs); and
lastly, those who would support any deal (around 50 MPs), focusing mainly on helping the
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British Prime Minister in this complex situation as well as delivering on the referendum results
to leave the EU by 29 March 2019 (Dickson, 2018; Wheeler, 2018).
In an interview with Senior Lecturer at the University of Loughborough, Dr. Tim Oliver
made clear that this complex situation was the result of the fact that the 52% of voters who
chose to leave the European Union did not know what kind of a relationship the UK and EU
should have after London leaves the Union. He stressed that Since June 2016, there have been
unresolved debates in the UK on this, which resulted in a situation of no majority in the British
House of Commons for any of Brexit models, no majority for a “no-deal” Brexit and no
majority for reversing the decision to leave.
These severe splits have resulted in tens of calls for a vote of no confidence against the
British Prime Minister by her party members who oppose her Brexit proposals (Sabbagh,
2018), which represents a serious threat to the negotiations between London and Brussels in
case there would be a change of government before the two sides finish their negotiations and
endorse the withdrawal agreement.
First Secretary in the Egyptian Commercial Office in Brussels, Mohamed Wahish was
asked about the consequences of these internal divisions on Brexit. Wahish assumed that these
“widening differences”, especially the ones among May’s Cabinet and party may lead to a vote
of no confidence against May’s government. He added that if this happens, the new government
may call for a second referendum on Brexit as a solution for this complicated situation.
Another expected outcome if the British political parties and MPs remain divided is
that the UK may leave the bloc without manging to reach a withdrawal deal that ensures an
organized Brexit. When asked about this scenario, Professor Cygan emphasized that a “nodeal” Brexit will be problematic for both sides and that is why they try to avoid this situation.
He also made clear that the consequences of this scenario will be harder for the British
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government that, in this case, will have to negotiate new trade deals and agreements with many
other countries. However, Cygan did not completely exclude this scenario, especially if the
British House of Commons remains divided on Brexit proposals.
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Chapter 6: Brexit negotiations concluded

In November 2018, it was announced that the European Commission and British
negotiators managed to reach an agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the
European Union. The objective of this 585-page agreement is to set the arrangements for the
divorce to ensure that it will happen in an orderly manner. It is important to clarify here that
this document is meant to only regulate the two parties’ relationship during the 21-month
implementation/transitional period. For their future relationship after the implementation
period, the UK and the EU have agreed on a political declaration that accompanied the
Withdrawal Agreement (WA) and that sets out the framework of the two parties’ future
relationship that is planned to be negotiated by the end of the implementation period.

6.1 First: The Withdrawal Agreement
The Withdrawal Agreement covers common provisions, rights of UK and EU citizens,
the financial settlement, a transition period, an overall governance structure, a “backstop plan”
for the Irish borders and other separation issues.
First, the agreement has referred to a number of provisions seeking to ensure the correct
application of the WA and to make sure that both parties adopt the correct understanding and
interpretation of the Agreement. Among the key issues tackled in this section of the WA is the
supremacy of the CJEU and EU laws which have been widely rejected by British people and
hard Brexiteers.
According to the Agreement, the UK will have to remain under the CJEU jurisdiction
during the implementation period. For example, to issues relevant to the WA, Article 4(2) gives
EU laws supremacy over national laws. Moreover, the UK courts will be required to stop
applying domestic laws and legislations that are not consistent with the WA or EU laws
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applicable under the Agreement. Furthermore, to take into consideration the demands of
Britons who reject the supremacy of the CJEU, the agreement suggested a compromise that
settle disputes on the interpretation of the WA, a joint UK-EU committee will be established
(European Union Committee of House of Lords, 2018; Morris, 2018).
Second, on citizens’ rights, the withdrawal agreement came with a balanced terms that
protect citizens’ rights and at the same time limits the free movement after the transitional
period by specifying some regulations and procedures to be applied to guarantee citizens a
“settled status”. However, only during this period, EU citizens residing in the Kingdom and
British citizens residing in the EU27 until the end of the implementation period will continue
to enjoy all their residency and social security rights in accordance with the EU’s Free
Movement Directive (Peers, 2018).
After December 2020, free movement will end, and citizens of the UK who want to
reside in any of the EU 27 Member States as well as EU citizens who want to reside in the
Kingdom would have to meet some specified conditions (such as, among other conditions,
staying in the host country for at least five years) to be able to apply for permanent residence
(Morris, 2018).
Third, with regard to the financial settlement, the WA does not mention a specific
figure on the total amount that the UK government would pay, but it suggests a mechanism
that help to calculate the total amount that London owes to Brussels based on the former’s
outstanding commitments and its share of assets and liabilities. This net cost, however, is
expected to be about £35-39 billion, taking into consideration that the final figure will depend
on future events (European Union Committee of House of Lords, 2018; Morris & Kibasi,
2018).
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In fact, while there has been a wide opposition to the UK’s contributions to the EU
budget, the UK will continue to benefit from the EU programmes that London pays to be
participate in such as the European Development fund. Therefore, the British beneficiaries of
these programmes should respect the EU regulations for these programmes, including cofinancing. In addition, as mentioned in earlier in Chapter 5 of this study, part of this amount
will be paid to cover the financial obligations made when the UK was still a member of the
EU. Besides, some commentators argue that without giving concessions on this controversial
issue, progress on other issues of negotiations would not be possible. Lastly, the British
government acknowledged that these financial obligations should be paid regardless of the final
outcome of the Brexit negotiations (European Union Committee of House of Lords, 2018;
Morris, 2018).
Fourth, the arrangements during the transition period, the UK government could not
manage to reach a deal that considers the concerns of the many Brexit supporters who do not
want the EU laws to be applied to the UK. What the government manage to reach is expected
to face strong criticisms and opposition by “hard Brexiteers” who will not accept the EU laws
to continue to apply to the UK during the implementation period and at the same time, as the
WA states, the UK government and its citizens will be deprived from many privileges of the
EU membership.
According to the Withdrawal Agreement’s provisions, during the implementation
period, the UK will be treated as an EU member and it commits to follow the vast majority of
EU laws. Yet, the exception is that Britain will no longer have the right to participate in the
decision-making within institutions of the EU (Morris & Kibasi, 2018). Which means, in other
words, the UK will accept EU laws, participate in the Customs Union and Single Market (with
its four freedoms) and automatically accept and apply any changes to EU laws without having
a say on any of these changes. The kingdom will, therefore, accept the supremacy of the
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Union’s supervisory, budgetary, regulatory, trade and judiciary laws (European Union
Committee of House of Lords, 2018).
Furthermore, for British citizens, they will lose their rights to vote in or run for
European elections. They will no longer have the right to participate in European citizens’
initiatives in addition to ceasing the eligibility to be recruited as officials or servants in EU’s
agencies and bodies (European Union Committee of House of Lords, 2018).
These commitments do not comply with what the majority of British voters have voted
for, neither do they comply with the government’s promise of “taking back control” of UK’s
domestic laws (Morrise, 2018). Therefore, the WA and Theresa May are expected to receive
wide criticisms because of this part of the agreement in particular.
Fifth, the governance of the Withdrawal Agreement may be another contentious part
of the Agreement as it gives supremacy for the CJEU in some cases. In general this section of
the WA provided institutional arrangements that seek to guarantee that the Agreement and all
its provisions would be implemented and enforced effectively, especially when disputes arise,
which would require a dispute settlement mechanism.
The two parties agreed to establish a joint UK-EU committee to supervise the
implementation and application of the WA. This committee should operate on the basis of
mutual consent and will have sub-committees that would be specialized in different areas
(Morris & Kibasi, 2018). However, what may be widely objected, especially by the “hard
Brexit supporters who do not accept the supremacy of the EU Court, is how the Agreement
deals with disputes concerning the interpretation of the WA. In this case, and if the joint
committee fails to find a solution, any of the parties can refer the dispute to a binding arbitration
panel that must request the CJEU’s binding ruling where the dispute is related to a question of
the EU law. The final decision of the arbitration panel would be binding for the two sides and
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there would be sanctions and financial penalties imposed in case of non-compliance by any of
the parties (The European Commission, 2018).
Sixth, with regard to the controversial issue of the Irish borders, the UK and the EU
agreed in the WA to the terms of the so-called “backstop” plan/solution for the issue of Irish
borders. This plan should be applied if the two sides fail to reach a long-term trade deal that
avoids hard borders in the island of Ireland by December 2020, and if there is no extension to
the transition period. The Agreement states clearly that the backstop plan consists of “a single
customs territory between the Union and the United Kingdom,” (Morris, 2018, para. 19) having
Northern Ireland involved in a deeper customs relationship with the EU than the rest of the
UK. Moreover, the backstop plan will require close alignment of Northern Ireland to the Single
Market’s rules and regulations. The plan will also restrict London’s freedom to make its own
trade policy choices as it will be required to comply with relevant parts of the Union’s
commercial policy, particularly, tariffs imposed on imports from third countries and rules of
origin (Morris & Kibasi, 2018).
In fact, the arrangements of the backstop plan “does not prevent an independent trade
policy, but it does severely constrain its policymaking in this field” (Morris & Kibasi, 2018, p.
5). It is expected that supporters of “hard Brexit” would not accept the WA’s arrangements for
the “backstop plan” as they always argued that the whole UK must exit the customs union to
be able to negotiate the free trade deals it wants with other countries (Henley, 2018).

6.2 Second: The Political Declaration
Unlike the Withdrawal Agreement, the Political Declaration (PD) is not a legallybinding document. As explained earlier, the WA covers only the EU-UK relationship in the
transitional period, as the actual agreement that regulates the two parties’ relationship after
December 2020 will still be negotiated during the transitional period. Therefore, the two sides
negotiated an agreed on this declaration to be the general framework within which they will
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negotiate their future relationship agreement, which will not be limited to trade, but rather a
comprehensive agreement to regulate the two sides’ future partnership. According to the PD’s
original text, the Declaration “establishes the parameters of an ambitious, broad, deep and
flexible partnership across trade and economic cooperation, law enforcement and criminal
justice, foreign policy, security and defence and wider areas of cooperation” (Council of the
European Union, 2018, para. 3).
First, the PD has reiterated the “red lines” of both parties that have been clarified by
their officials in many previous occasions. For the EU, it stressed that its future relationship
with the UK should be consistent with the Union’s principles that respect the integrity of the
Internal Market and the Customs Union in addition to the “indivisibility” of the four freedoms.
As for the UK, the Declaration emphasized that the future partnership agreement must ensure
the sovereignty of the Kingdom, protect its internal market, allow London to have its own
“independent trade policy” and end the free movement of people (Council of the European
Union, 2018). This shows a significant incompatibility in the positions of the two sides, which
may hinder their ability to compromise and reach the desired “ambitious, broad, deep”
partnership they seek (Cardwell, 2018).
In addition, on the role of courts and mechanism to settle future disputes, the
Political Declaration was not different from the Withdrawal Agreement. In the PD, the parties
agreed on a system to resolve disputes through a joint committee and an arbitration panel. And
in case the matter is related to the EU law, the final say would be for the CJEU (Morris, 2018).
This makes it clear that the UK government had to sacrifice by allowing the CJEU to have a
superior role in exchange for a future ambitious and comprehensive partnership deal in goods
and services with Brussels (Foster, Isaac & Crisp, 2018).
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Third, on free movement of people and citizens’ rights, the PD has clearly recognized
the British government’s desire to end free movement, and accordingly, it expressed the
parties’ commitment to establish future “mobility arrangements” that will be based on nondiscrimination and reciprocity in areas such as visa free travel for short-term visits. Also, the
UK and the EU agreed to ensure temporary entry for business purposes in certain areas,
consider conditions for entry and stay for study and research purposes as well as training and
youth exchanges (House of Commons Library, 2018). This has been seen by some analysts as
a success for the British government as it managed to reach an agreement on this point that
considers the demands of almost everyone in the UK. On one side, it makes clear that the
Union’s free movement rules will no longer apply to London after Brexit. While the future
arrangements to apply this will still be negotiated, the British government promised in previous
occasions that it is willing to introduce a “permit system” that favours high-skilled migrants.
On the other side, the British government also did not ignore the demands of businessmen and
holiday travellers, ensuring them visa free travel to Europe on reciprocal basis (Foster, Isaac &
Crisp, 2018).
With regard to the future economic partnership, the negotiators of the two parties
expressed their commitment in the PD to “develop an ambitious, wide-ranging and balanced
economic partnership” that includes a “free trade area” and sectoral cooperation in areas of
mutual interest (Council of the European Union, 2018). What can be deduced from the
Declaration’s general framework on trade in goods is that the two parties seek a trading
relationship on goods that is “as close as possible”, committing themselves to ambitious
economic partnership and open and fair competition (Morris, 2018). For some experts, this
may refer to the fact that the aim of an agreement that ensures “frictionless” trade has been
downgraded as there is no reference to “frictionless” trade in the document, which is unlikely
to be accepted by Brexit supporters in the UK (Cardwell, 2018).
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As for trade in services, which is more critical for the British economy than goods, the
PD does not show serious commitments to a deep relationship, leaving trade in services open
for future negotiations. The Declaration stated that the future agreement should aim at a deal
that takes liberalization in trade in services into a higher level beyond the WTO commitments
(Cardwell, 2018; House of Commons Library, 2018).
Fifth, for the critical issue of the Irish borders, the Political Declaration has expressed
the two parties’ commitment to avoid hard borders in the island of Ireland without providing
details on future solutions to replace the backstop plan of the Withdrawal Agreement. The
Declaration stated that “the Parties recall their determination to replace the backstop solution
on Northern Ireland by a subsequent agreement that establishes alternative arrangements for
ensuring the absence of a hard border on the island of Ireland” (Council of the European Union,
2018, para. 19).
In addition to the above-mentioned issues, the Political Declaration has set out the
general framework on “comprehensive and balanced security partnership” between London
and Brussels that includes internal police cooperation in addition to on border foreign policy
and defence cooperation (Morris, 2018).
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Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusion of the Study
7.1 Summary of the study
This study has focused on the complicated Brexit negotiations in light of the different
positions and objectives of the British government and the European Union’s leaders in
addition to the divisions among the British parties. This tough process of negotiations may not
succeed in reaching a deal that first, achieves the different objectives of the British government
and the EU, and second, fulfils all the conflicting demands of the UK’s political actors. This
scenario, which has been referred to as the “No-deal Brexit”, is not a desired scenario neither
for London nor Brussels because of its potential catastrophic implications that have been
analysed in many other studies.
In order to study the Brexit negotiations’ process and how it may affect the future EUUK relationship, it was necessary first to interpret Article 50 TEU of the Lisbon Treaty of the
EU, which is the first Article of an EU document that gives the EU Member States the right to
withdraw from the Union and defines general rules for this withdrawal process.
By signing Lisbon Treaty that entered into force in 2009, the treaty introduced the first
article of an EU treaty that allows Member States to leave the Union and specifies the steps
that should be taken by the withdrawing member and the Union. In its first paragraph, Article
50 TEU gives the EU members the right to decide to withdraw from the Union whenever they
want without having to provide reasons for this decision. Giving its members this right to
withdraw at any time, the article showed that the EU recognizes its members’ sovereignty and
that they consent to be part of this integration project.
Moreover, Article 50.2 TEU states that the withdrawal process would not be officially
initiated until the exiting member sends a written notification with its intention to leave to the
European Council. From this point, the Council and the exiting member can start a two-year
82

negotiations to conclude an agreement on the withdrawal as well as the future relationship
between the European Union and the withdrawing country. The British government on 29
March 2017 took this step and triggered Article 50, which means that the UK should officially
leave the Union maximum by 29 March 2019 whether or not the two sides would manage to
reach a withdrawal deal. In case they succeed, this agreement will not enter into force until the
European Council votes for the agreement by a qualified majority after obtaining the consent
of the European Parliament.
According to Article 50.3, the EU treaties will cease to apply to the withdrawing
member after a withdrawal deal with EU enters into force or when the two-year negotiations
period is over even if it is over before reaching a deal. However, the article also added that the
period of negotiations could be extended for more than two years only if the departing member
and the European Council unanimously agree to extend it.
During the negotiations’ period, the member that seeks to leave the Union enjoys almost
all its rights as a member and should stay committed to all its responsibilities and obligations.
Nonetheless, the only right or power this member cannot exercise, as per Article 50.4, is its
right to take part in the European Council’s discussions or decisions dealing with the member’s
withdrawal from the Union.
Lastly, Article 50 of Lisbon Treaty points out that to re-join the European Union after
withdrawal, the country should be treated like any other non-EU country that wants to be an
EU member. This means that it will have to follow all the accession procedures mentioned in
Article 49 TEU and that it will not receive any special treatment from the EU.
Although the withdrawal procedures may sound simple and clear, this study, in Chapter
4, has highlighted some of the problems and criticisms to Lisbon Treaty’s Article 50. The first
criticism the study referred to was the relatively short period of negotiations that is a two-year
83

period. Although theoretically, this period can be extended, it is very difficult to meet the
condition to extend the negotiation’s period, which requires a unanimous consent by the
European Council.
Secondly, the study highlighted that a key problem with Article 50 TEU is that its
wording was not clear enough on some vital issues, which resulted in some contradicting
interpretations of the article. The article, for example, was not clear on the possibility of
revoking the withdrawal notification in case a withdrawing country changes its mind and
decides to remain in the EU. Although this issue has been debatable because it was ignored by
Article 50 TEU, this study claims that a country may revoke its notification to withdraw, but
this would be difficult and most likely cannot be a unilateral revocation by the exiting member.
Thirdly, the study addressed another problem concerning the scope of Article 50 of
Lisbon Treaty and the number of agreements that need to be concluded by the departing
member and the EU for withdrawal, which have not been clearly explained by the article. This
issue has been subject to many debates; nevertheless, some experts as well as the negotiations’
developments have shown that there should be two agreements; one to regulate the terms of
withdrawal itself, and another one that would focus on the future relationship between the
Union and the withdrawing member.
In addition to explaining the withdrawal procedures, this study, in its fifth chapter,
focused on the different positions and objectives of the UK and EU on one side, and the
different stances and views of British political actors on the other side through explaining the
key issues that have been discussed over the past nineteen months since the negotiations started
in April 2017. In fact, one study cannot be enough to cover all issues of negotiations and all
the details of each of these issues. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, only some critical
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issues have been explained in order to analyse the different positions and objectives concerning
the desired withdrawal agreement and the future UK-EU relationship.
In contrast with to the UK’s desired approach in negotiations, the European Union
decided that Brexit negotiations would be held on two phases in order to avoid a chaotic Brexit
that may be the result of negotiating all issues of Brexit at once. The first phase has focused
mainly on citizens’ rights, the borders between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland
and financial settlements. After achieving a “sufficient progress” in phase one, the second
phase –that was built on the first one’s progress- started to discuss the terms of the UK’s
withdrawal from the Union as well as the relationship between both sides during the
implementation/transitional period.
The first and second phases of negotiations showed that there has been a significant
difference between the UK’s objective and the EU’s one. Britain for example, wanted an FTAbased relationship, including a tailored, broad and deep economic partnership that covers areas
that matter for the UK’s economy such as trade in services. At the same time, Britain has been
trying to reach a deal that allows the government to have its freedom to make its own trade
deals with third party countries and impose a new system to limit the free movement of people.
However, for the European Union, these ambitious proposals were seen unrealistic as they give
the UK more advantages that other non-EU countries that have trade agreements with Brussels
(such as Norway, Switzerland and Canada). The EU’s negotiations’ guidelines were clear and
strict from the beginning emphasizing that the UK cannot benefit from the EU’s privileges
without committing to the required obligations of these advantages.
Also, although the two parties agree in principle that that there should not be hard
borders between Ireland and Northern Ireland, the negotiations showed that they have a
different position on the practical solution for this matter. While the British government
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affirmed that the whole UK should leave the Single Market and Customs Union of the EU in
order not to threaten the unity of the Kingdom, the EU’s negotiator still saw that a practical
solution would be keeping Northern Ireland in the Customs Union while the rest of the UK
would leave.
In November 2018, the negotiations were concluded by reaching a Withdrawal
Agreement that sets the arrangements for the divorce in addition to a Political Declaration that
identifies the general framework of the two parties’ future relationship that is planned to be
negotiated by the end of the Brexit implementation period.
The Withdrawal Agreement came with several proposals that sound to be difficult to
be accepted by the British Brexit supporters who do not accept the supremacy of the CJEU and
the EU’s laws. The WA makes it clear that the UK, during the implementation period, will
have to accept the EU laws in many areas in exchange for being able to participate in the
Union’s Single Market and Customs Union. In addition, London will have to accept the
supremacy of the CJEU in some cases when disputes on the WA arises. Yet, on the other hand,
the UK managed to reach a balanced agreement on citizens’ rights and free movement as part
of the WA. Lastly, for the Irish borders issue, the UK and EU agreed that in case they fail to
reach a long-term trade deal that avoids hard borders in the island of Ireland by December
2020, they will apply the so-called “backstop plan” that involves Northern Ireland in a deeper
customs relationship with the EU than the rest of the UK.`
Besides, the negotiators also agreed on a Political Declaration that identifies the general
framework within which they will negotiate the UK-EU future relationship agreement after the
end of the transitional period. The PD reconfirmed the red-lines of the UK and EU, which
shows a significant difference in the positions of the two sides concerning their future
relationship. Furthermore, the PD showed the intention of the two parties to have a future
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ambitious, wide-ranging and balanced economic partnership based on a free trade area and
cooperation in some sectors. It also offered a promising framework on free movement and
citizens’ rights that will end free movement after the transitional period, but at the same time
will ensure that businessmen and holiday travellers can have visa free travel to EU members
on reciprocal basis. However, on the role of EU courts and the mechanism to settle disputes,
the PD allowed the EU Court of Justice to have a superior role in some cases. In addition, the
Declaration also did not offer new arrangements to solve the Irish borders issue in future as it
only emphasized the commitment of the two parties to avoid hard borders without mentioning
any practical details on how this could be done.

7.2 Conclusion
This study has focused on studying the Brexit and its negotiations to see how this
negotiations’ process may shape the future relationship between the United Kingdom and
European Union. The main conclusion of this study is that in light of the different objectives,
interests and positions on Brexit that have been illustrated in the previous chapters, the UK and
EU may not be able to reach a final withdrawal agreement as well as a balanced future
partnership agreement that will be accepted by the divided British political actors. This may
lead to a no-deal Brexit that is expected to lead to catastrophic implications for both sides’
economies.
The British government had not prepared for the Brexit negotiations before triggering
Article 50 to start the two-year negotiations’ period with the EU. In addition, the British
withdrawal from the Union was the first case of a Member State that leaves the bloc, which
means that there was no previous cases that could have guided the two parties concerning how
the withdrawal should happen and how their future relationship should look like. This has
resulted in more debates on Brexit among the British political actors who supported different
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proposals for Brexit and the future UK-EU relationship. These proposals are not simply
different, but they indeed carry conflicting views in some areas.
Besides, the positions and objectives of the UK and EU have been also significantly
different. Although the Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration that were announced
in November 2018 showed that the two sides managed to offer compromises in some areas,
there are still some other critical issues that they could not agree on such an alternative solution
for the Irish borders and a deal on trade in services that allows the UK to benefit from the EU’s
Internal Market and at the same time have its own independent deals with other countries. Even
if the two sides manage to reach a common ground on these substantial matters, the British
government would still face a serious challenge that is the strong opposition to the WA and PD
by the majority of the Members of Parliament (MPs), including a serious number of
Conservative MPs.
In light of this complicated situation, the future of the Withdrawal Agreement and
Political Declaration is not clear. The study has showed that they will most probably be voted
against in the British Parliament unless the Conservative MPs who do not support these
proposals change their opinion before the voting takes place. There is a number of potential
scenarios in case the House of Commons votes down the proposed Brexit deal. First, the British
government may still have time to renegotiate the deal with the EU to try to find better solutions
for issues of contention. However, to change the position of those who do not accept the
government’s deal, significant concessions need to be made by the EU, which is unlikely to
happen because the latter has been following a strict approach in negotiations to avoid a Brexit
agreement that allows the UK to benefit from the EU’s privileges without committing to the
required obligations.
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Second, regarding the wide calls inside the parliament for a second referendum as a
possible solution for this impasse, the British government has expressed in many occasions its
strict rejection to this suggestion, insisting that there should not be a second referendum as
people have already voted to leave in June 2016. In addition, May argued that if the government
agrees to hold a second referendum, there may be future calls on a third referendum which will
delay the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and create wider divisions instead of bringing together
the British political actors to make Brexit happen orderly.
A third possible scenario, therefore, is that the UK may withdraw without a deal. in
light of these widening divisions among the British parties and the unwillingness of the EU to
give more concessions to London, a “no-deal” Brexit is very likely to happen, which will
negatively affect the future relationship between the two parties as the UK will leave the Union
without any deals on the very critical issues that have been negotiated for almost twenty
months.
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